VEOs are intimidated if state threats are executed or if states retaliate after a provocative terrorist attack.

4; 5; 102; 6; 7; 8

General Description of the Literature:

These hypotheses relate to the general case of provocation and retaliation against attacks, which includes—but is not limited to—a formal deterrence situation (consisting of conscious state efforts to use threats prior to an attack in order to prevent the attack). There is very little analysis of how VEOs react to threats or retaliation – only incidental mentions or assumptions without necessarily empirical support. Dugan and Chenoweth (2012) provide a robust analysis of Israeli policies towards Palestinian terrorism that suggests conciliatory actions are related to a decrease in the likelihood of future terrorist attacks; however, repressive actions are either related to an increase in the likelihood of future terrorist attacks or are unrelated to such attacks.

Detailed Analyses

4: *VEOs are intimidated if states retaliate after a provocative terrorist attack.*

Summary of Relevant Empirical Evidence: Literature on Israeli retaliation is mixed, but many (e.g., Bar 2008) think that the use of force reinforces deterrence. Cohen (2010) does not believe this to be the case, based on the same record, with regard to Palestinians. Otherwise, retaliation for provocation is extremely rare. Crenshaw (2003) shows that Al Qaida was not intimidated after the American retaliation in 1998. However, Trager and Zagorcheva (2006) mention that reaction after an attack might strengthen deterrence, and conclude that a strong post-attack response is important. Wilner (2010) found that targeted killings in Afghanistan had at least a temporary deterrent effect (based on selected case studies). He provides a sophisticated analysis suggesting that it is not just the level, but the type of VEO violence that should be considered. However, it is not clear whether the intention behind the targeted killings was retaliation for provocation or to fulfill a threat – or just to remove a leader because he was an efficient adversary.

Empirical Support Score: 1 = Anecdotal support only for the hypothesis

Applicability to Influencing VEOs: Applies directly although as noted empirical foundations are weak and findings contradictory.

Applicability Score: Direct: At least some of the empirical results directly concern the context of influencing VEOs.

5: *VEOs are emboldened by state passivity in the face of provocation, leading to escalation.*

Summary of Relevant Empirical Evidence: Literature on Israeli retaliation is mixed, but many think that the use of force reinforces deterrence (e.g., Bar 2008). Cohen (2010) thinks the opposite with regard to Israel. Otherwise, outside the Israeli context and perhaps the Russia-Chechen context, retaliation for provocation is extremely rare, but there is no analysis of the VEO reaction. Crenshaw (2003) shows that Al Qaida was not intimidated after the American retaliation in 1998. However, Trager and Zagorcheva

(2006) mention that reaction after an attack might strengthen deterrence, and conclude that a strong post-attack response is important. There is, however, no empirical analysis of this proposition.

Empirical Support Score: 2 = Multiple qualitative and/or quantitative studies with mixed results (i.e., some in favor, some against the hypothesis) but more negative than positive findings.

Applicability to Influencing VEOs: Direct

Applicability Score: Direct: At least some of the empirical results directly concern the context of influencing VEOs.

102: *VEOs are emboldened by state use of "soft power" in the face of provocation, leading to escalation.*

Summary of Relevant Empirical Evidence: There is no relevant empirical evidence. One could draw some inferences from the proposition that force works, but they would be weak. As noted above, we do not know the effects of passivity either.

Empirical Support Score: 0 = No empirical support (for or against the hypothesis)

Applicability to Influencing VEOs: Direct.

Applicability Score: Not Applicable – There is no empirical support in any context.

6: *Alternately, VEOs are emboldened if states retaliate, thus commencing a cycle of violence and counterviolence.*

Summary of Relevant Empirical Evidence: Israel's response is the usual subject of empirical analysis or at least of commentary. Cohen (2010) suggests that the use of force by the IDF against Palestinians has led to escalation, based on a historical review of the conflict. Adler (2010) suggests that such a provocation-retaliation cycle is the dominant trend in post-Cold War international politics, but his evidence is extremely weak (examples are mostly from the Israeli case). Fielding and Shortland (2010) find that both political arrests and security force raids increase subsequent insurgent activity in the immediate months that follow the intervention. Crenshaw's research shows the opposite: that retaliation is uncommon and not the norm. As noted with regard to other hypotheses on the effects of the use of force, many authors think that retaliation is essential.

Empirical Support Score: 3 = Multiple qualitative and/or quantitative studies with mixed results (i.e. some in favor, some against the hypothesis), but more positive than negative findings.

Applicability to Influencing VEOs: The studies that have been performed are in the context of VEOs.

Applicability Score: Direct: At least some of the empirical results directly concern the context of influencing VEOs.

7: Repression last month increases the likelihood of terrorist attacks this month; conciliatory actions last month decrease the likelihood.

Summary of Relevant Empirical Evidence: Dugan and Chenoweth (2012) directly address the hypothesis by analyzing the relative effects of Israeli government actions towards Palestinians from 1987 to 2004. Their robust statistical analysis shows repression this month may increase terrorist attacks next month, while conciliatory attacks may decrease the number of terrorist attacks in the same time period. It

is important to note that since the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a daily conflict in the study period, monthly effects are considered long term while weekly effects are considered short term. Analysis and recommendations outside of this conflict may have to specify different long and short term definitions.

Empirical Support Score: 7 = Single, high-quality quantitative analysis supporting the hypothesis.

Applicability to Influencing VEOs: This study was done directly in the context of counterterrorism. However, it is unclear if the results would be fully generalizable to VEOs outside of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

Applicability Score: Direct: At least some of the empirical results directly concern the context of influencing VEOs.

8: *Repression last month increases the likelihood of terrorist attacks this month; conciliatory actions last month decrease the likelihood. And the correlation actually gets stronger when the actions in question are indiscriminate – i.e. when they target a population rather than a person.*

Summary of Relevant Empirical Evidence: Dugan and Chenoweth's analysis (2012) had stronger correlation when the strategies were used indiscriminately. Thus, indiscriminate repression is overall more likely to increase long term terrorist attacks than repression.

Empirical Support Score: 7 = Single, high-quality quantitative analysis supporting the hypothesis.

Applicability to Influencing VEOs: This study was done directly in the context of counterterrorism. However, it is unclear if the results would be fully generalizable to VEOs outside of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Applicability Score: Direct: At least some of the empirical results directly concern the context of influencing VEOs.

General comments (optional):

Empirical support for these hypotheses in general is weak. A general question with regard to the use of force and deterrence versus escalation is the generalizability of the Israeli case

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