Threatening retaliation against third-party enablers can help prevent terrorist organizations from obtaining needed resources.

44; 50; 51; 52; 53; 54; 45; 55; 57; 58

General Description of the Literature:

In general, states are thought to be more likely to respond to coercion than non-states (Crenshaw 2003). However, the conditions under which they respond to retaliatory threats remain obscure. One factor that may determine how states respond to coercion is their relationship to the threatening state (Gunaratna 2005). Whether or not non-state third parties will respond to threats by cutting off support for VEOs is also unclear. Whether or not deterrence or other forms of coercion succeed or fail is hard to know. Note that references to retaliation generally assume that it implies the use of force or some punishment. Most studies of deterrence of third parties post 9/11 focus on deterring nuclear terrorism, although some consider deterring all terrorism (e.g, Allison 2008; Frost 2005; Almog 2004; Castillo 2003; Colby 2007; Knopf 2008; Miller 2007; Levi 2008; Talmadge 2007; Wilson 2008). Findings are contradictory and empirical evidence for or against most hypotheses is weak. Many of the assertions are supposition or speculation.

Detailed Analyses

44: *Threatening retaliation against third-party enablers can help prevent terrorist organizations from obtaining needed resources.*

Summary of Relevant Empirical Evidence: Graham (2010) argues that organizations that lack a national base are unlikely to be deterred by retaliation threats. Knopf (2008) suggests that deterrence of "rogue states" could work, if combined with other options, and many other authors agree. Less attention is paid to non-state third parties. However, there is scant empirical evidence that threats of retaliation produce compliance. Nor is it evident that terrorist organizations depend on resources from third parties rather than resources they generate themselves (e.g., through criminality). In general, terrorism requires little in the way of material resources. Both of these propositions need to be demonstrated.

Empirical Support Score: 0 = No empirical support (for or against the hypothesis)

Applicability to Influencing VEOs: N/A.

Applicability Score: N/A

50: *The threatened or actual use of force against state sponsors will influence the behavior of VEOs.*

Summary of Relevant Empirical Evidence: Byman (2005) and Crenshaw (2003) use case studies to show how difficult it is to employ a strategy of threats, as well as the use of force against state sponsors. Case studies provide evidence that the hypothesis is not supported, but they may not constitute clear empirical findings. The cases of Libya, Iran, and the Taliban are often cited as instances of resistance to threats and use of force, since Libya responded to the 1986 bombings with the bombing of Pan Am 103 in 1988 (see also the discussion of other hypotheses). Knopf (2008)

argues that deterrence of "rogue states" could work, if combined with other options. However, evidence is weak.

Empirical Support Score: 1 = Anecdotal support only for the hypothesis

Applicability to Influencing VEOs: These studies concern influencing state sponsors of terrorism.

Applicability Score: Direct: At least some of the empirical results directly concern the context of influencing VEOs.

51: *Threatening punishment against state actors who sponsor or support VEOs will decrease that support and thereby reduce the operational capacity of the sponsored VEOs.*

Summary of Relevant Empirical Evidence: Presumably, this hypothesis refers to threats as distinct from use of force, but the studies referred to above, and most others as well, include both (as does hypothesis 50). The success of deterring state support/sponsorship of VEOs is contingent upon the relationship between the threatening state and the VEO-supporting state (Gunaratna 2005). Punishment might also involve financial sanctions, so the concept might be broader than the use of military force. However, there is little evidence as to the effectiveness of threats in general or threats of sanctions in particular. The retaliatory use of force against either state sponsors or VEOs is rare, except in the Israeli and Russian cases. The United States has also used retaliatory military force in addition to threats. Threats against the Taliban 1998-2001 were ineffective (Crenshaw 2003).

Empirical Support Score: 1 = Anecdotal support only for the hypothesis

Applicability to Influencing VEOs: These studies refer directly to state assistance to VEOs.

Applicability Score: Direct: At least some of the empirical results directly concern the context of influencing VEOs.

52: *Engaging in preventive or preemptive use of force against state sponsors of VEOs will deter the targeted and other states from sponsoring groups and thereby reduce the operational capacity of the sponsored VEOs.*

Summary of Relevant Empirical Evidence: The question is whether the use of force is compatible with deterrence, implying that if so, the use of force would be demonstrative and anticipatory rather than as a response to a provocation. It would presumably add credibility to subsequent threats. Almog (2004) argues that "cumulative deterrence" works in the Israeli and American cases. He cites many IDF victories against enemy states as reasons why these states are now more moderate towards Israel. Almog conceptualizes cumulative deterrence with three stages: small military victories, leading to increasingly moderate behavior, concluding with peace. Lebovic (2007) and Knopf (2008), however believe that deterrence and preemption are incompatible based on analysis of past American policy. Preventive and preemptive use of force is rare in international relations thus empirical analysis is weak.

Empirical Support Score: 1 = Anecdotal support only for the hypothesis

Applicability to Influencing VEOs: Directly pertains to influencing VEOs.

Applicability Score: Direct: At least some of the empirical results directly concern the context of influencing VEOs.

53: *Threatening punishment (up to and including the retaliatory use of WMD) against states will deter them from transferring or allowing negligent transfer of WMD to VEOs*

Summary of Relevant Empirical Evidence: This hypothesis has received a lot of attention, but there is no consensus. Few analysts would support the retaliatory use of WMD. Levi (2007 and 2008) would disagree that threats will deter transfer, as would all the "pessimists" who think that deterrence vs. WMD terrorism will not be effective (e.g. Wilson 2008, who cites a problematic historical record of conventional and nuclear deterrence). Frost (2005) believes that deterrence is effective against potential state suppliers of WMD to VEOs because he thinks such states are sensitive to risk. Allison (2008), Garfinkle (2009), Levi (2004), Whiteneck (2005), and Colby (2007) are also optimists about the effectiveness of deterrence with regard to WMD transfer to VEOs. Similarly, Castillo (2003) thinks deterrence is effective, as long as the threat is not to overturn the regime. Knopf (2008) agrees that calling for regime change will undermine deterrence. Moreover, through historical anecdotes, Fisher (2007) highlights the importance of the delivery of the threat and the credibility the threatening state has of actually carrying the threat out. Most of the empirical evidence presented in these arguments is based on observation of the past behavior of states that are potential suppliers. There are no references to examples of states that refrained because they were threatened, or of states that persisted in the face of threats.

Empirical Support Score: 1 = Anecdotal support only for the hypothesis

Applicability to Influencing VEOs: Directly relevant.

Applicability Score: Direct: At least some of the empirical results directly concern the context of influencing VEOs.

54: *Threatening automatic retaliation against any state that allows WMD materials to fall into the hands of VEOs can decrease the likelihood that the state will cooperate after an attack to track who obtained the WMD materials, and this increases the probability of follow-on terrorist attacks.*

Summary of Relevant Empirical Evidence: There is no empirical evidence one way or another, but Levi (2007) argues that this outcome is likely based on his assessment of North Korea and Russia. See also Levi (2004 and 2008).

Empirical Support Score: 1 = Anecdotal support only for the hypothesis

Applicability to Influencing VEOs: Direct

Applicability Score: Direct: At least some of the empirical results directly concern the context of influencing VEOs.

45: *Investing in and publicizing forensic capabilities to identify the source of nuclear (or any WMD) materials used in an attack will decrease the likelihood of third parties supplying materials or allowing them to leak.*

Summary of Relevant Empirical Evidence: There is a general consensus that attribution is critical to deterrence, as well as to apprehension and recovery, should deterrence fail. Whether or not communicating one's ability will deter third parties from deliberate supply or careless handling is not known although it is logical that it would reinforce deterrence. Deterring nuclear terrorism is official US policy but its effects cannot be seen. Miller (2007) argues that attribution is not the most important element of deterrence, although admittedly it is important, but the United States has not

done enough to improve or publicize its capability. Talmadge (2007) and Dunlop and Smith (2006) also stress attribution. Levi (2008) believes that attribution will be most effective against North Korea, but should not be relied on in other cases. The National Academies nuclear forensics report (2010) called for improvement in American capabilities. It is probably the strongest empirical analysis of capabilities in the unclassified literature.

Empirical Support Score: 1 = Anecdotal support only for the hypothesis

Applicability to Influencing VEOs: This question is directly relevant to influencing VEOs since the majority of analysts conclude that VEOs will only acquire usable WMD materials, especially fissile materials, from states that are either complicit or careless. There is debate, however, as to the independent capability of nonstate actors. Aum Shinrikyo acquired a chemical capacity on its own, although it was an unusual organization.

Applicability Score: Direct: At least some of the empirical results directly concern the context of influencing VEOs.

55: *Communicating and publicizing attribution capabilities and programs to state actors can deter support to VEO WMD acquisition.*

Summary of Relevant Empirical Evidence: This hypothesis refers only to states while the previous one refers to non-state third parties, such as the AQ Khan network (assuming it was an independent actor). There appears to be general support for communicating both capacity and determination but there is no empirical evidence that even the most credible communications are effective. On the other hand, state actors have not transferred WMD materials to VEOs.

Empirical Support Score: 0 = No empirical support (for or against the hypothesis)

Applicability to Influencing VEOs: N/A

Applicability Score: Not Applicable – There is no empirical support in any context.

57: *Preemptively targeting private, non-state enablers (e.g. financiers) may deter the provision of support terrorists need to carry out operations.*

Summary of Relevant Empirical Evidence: The literature on terrorist financing is immense but inconclusive. The focus is typically on regulation of financial transfers and assets rather than threats, although perhaps studies of the effects of sanctions in general would be pertinent. Perhaps the question is about the possible effect of the threat of sanctions. This hypothesis also seems to presume that terrorism is dependent on third party assistance. Note that this hypothesis is apparently related to whether or not the limited use of force enhances deterrence, (e.g., Almog's concept of cumulative deterrence) or whether it is an indication that deterrence has failed. As noted, Almog argues that the case of Israel shows that small military victories work against states.

Empirical Support Score: 1 = Anecdotal support only for the hypothesis

Applicability to Influencing VEOs: Somewhat relevant.

Applicability Score: Not Applicable – There is no empirical support in any context.

58: *Retaliating (post attack) against non-state supporters and enablers of terrorism may deter the future provision of support or facilitation of terrorist organizations by such actors*

Summary of Relevant Empirical Evidence: There is no empirical support for this claim.

Empirical Support Score: 0 = No empirical support (for or against the hypothesis)

Applicability to Influencing VEOs: No empirical results.

Applicability Score: Not Applicable – There is no empirical support in any context.

Bibliography:

Allison, Graham T. 2005. *Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe*. New York, NY: Henry Holt.

Allison, Graham. 2008. "Nuclear Deterrence in the Age of Nuclear Terrorism." *Technology Review* 111(6): 68-73.

Almog, Doron. 2004. "Cumulative Deterrence and the War on Terrorism." *Parameters* 34(4): 4-19.

Byman, Daniel. 2005. *Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism.* Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Crenshaw, Martha. 2003. "Coercive Diplomacy and the Response to Terrorism." In *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy*, edited by Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Committee on Nuclear Forensics, Nuclear and Radiation Studies Board, Division on Earth and Life Studies, National Research Council, National Academies. 2010. *Nuclear Forensics: A Capability at Risk (Abbreviated Version)*. Washington, DC: National Academies Press. http://www.nap.edu/catalog/12966.html.

Castillo, J. J. 2003. "Nuclear Terrorism: Why Deterrence Still Matters." *Current History* 102: 426-431.

Colby, E. 2007. "Restoring Deterrence." *Orbis* 51(3): 413-428.

Dugan, Laura and Erica Chenoweth. 2012. "Deterrence: The Effectiveness of Raising the Expected Utility of Abstaining from Terrorism in Israel." *American Sociological Review* 77 (4): 597-624.

Dunlop, William, and Harold Smith. 2006. "Who Did It? Using International Forensics to Detect and Deter Nuclear Terrorism." *Arms Control Today* 36(8): 1-6.

Fisher, Uri. 2007. "Deterrence, Terrorism, and American Values." Homeland Security Affairs 3(1).

Frost, R. M. 2005. "Terrorism and Nuclear Deterrence." *Adelphi Papers* 45(378): 63-68.

Garfinkle, Adam. 2009. "Does Nuclear Deterrence Apply in the Age of Terrorism?" *Foreign Policy Research Institute* 14:10. Accessed March 7, 2012: http://www.fpri.org/footnotes/1410.200905.garfinkle.nucleardeterrenceterrorism.html

Graham, Bob. 2010. "Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism Report Card." Pennsylvania: Diane Publishing.

Gunaratna, Rohan. 2005. "The Prospects of Global Terrorism." *Society* 42(6): 31-35.

Knopf, Jeffery W. 2008. "Wrestling with Deterrence: Bush Administration Strategy after 9/11." *Contemporary Security Policy* 29 (2): 229-265.

Lebovic, James H. 2007. *Deterring International Terrorism and Rogue States: US National Security Policy after 9/11*. New York, NY: Routledge.

Levi, Michael. 2004. "Deterring Nuclear Terrorism." *Issues in Science & Technology* 20 (Spring): 1-4.

Levi, Michael. 2007. *On Nuclear Terrorism*. Boston, MA: Harvard University Press.

Levi, Michael. A. 2008. *Deterring State Sponsorship of Nuclear Terrorism*. New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations.

Miller, Michael. 2007. "Nuclear Attribution as Deterrence." *The Nonproliferation Review* 14(1): 33-60.

Talmadge, Caitlin. 2007. "Deterring a Nuclear 9/11." *The Washington Quarterly* 30(2): 21-34.

Whiteneck, Daniel. 2005. "Deterring Terrorists: Thoughts on a Framework." *The Washington Quarterly* 28(3):187–199.

Wilson, W. 2008. "The Myth of Nuclear Deterrence." *The Nonproliferation Review* 15(3): 421-439.