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Literature Review	Hypothesis	Empirical Support Score ?	Applicability Score ?	Knopf Typology ?	DIMEFIL ?	Davis and Jenkins ?	System Level Targeted ?	IVEO Framework ?
000011	Increased certainty of punishment for attacks deters VEOs from carrying out those attacks.	3	Direct	Military Deterrence/Coercion	Military	Deter		Coercion	Hypothesis 1 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis implies that the United States should maximize the perceived certainty of punishment for VEO attacks. How this might be achieved is not clear from the hypothesis, but options might include: 1. declaratory policy; 2. building a reputation of "getting its man" (i.e., devoting as many resources for as long as it takes to find and punish perpetrators) in order to increase the perceived probability of retaliation; 3. developing "trip wires" that would ensure an automatic response; or (more controversially) 4. retaliating in some way almost immediately after an attack even there is some level of uncertainty about who carried it out.
000022	The larger the size of a punishment, the less credible that it is.	1	Direct		Military	Deter			Hypothesis 2 Implications: If valid, an important implication would be that, In developing any declaratory policy to deter terrorism, the United States must carefully weigh the advantages and disadvantages of threatening massive punishment that may appear less credible versus threatening more moderate, but more credible responses. It would also be important to tailor punishment to the nature of the attack, including discriminate targeting that minimizes the chance of collateral damage and the lesser use of force or non-military options such as jail terms for less destructive attacks.
000033	Failure to follow through on a deterrent threat leads to loss of credibility and increased VEO activity.	1	Direct	Military Deterrence/Coercion	Military	Deter		Coercion	Hypothesis 3 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis implies that deterrence is not likely to work in the absence of a credible commitment to punish bad actors and thus that the United States should follow through on its threats to retaliate when deterrence against terrorism fails in order to avoid losing credibility.
000044	VEOs are intimidated if state threats are executed or if states retaliate after a provocative terrorist attack.	1	Direct		Military	Deter	Leaders, Loyalists		Hypothesis 4 Implications: If valid, the hypothesis implies that the United States should carry out its threats and retaliate in response to provocative terrorist attacks.
000055	VEOs are emboldened by state passivity in the face of provocation, leading to escalation.	2	Direct			Deter	Leaders, Loyalists		Hypothesis 5 Implications: If valid, this would imply that the United States should never be passive, but should rather respond aggressively (and most likely quickly) if VEOs conduct highly provocative attacks. Caveat: The hypothesis does not describe the type of response.
000066	Alternately, VEOs are emboldened if states retaliate, thus commencing a cycle of violence and counterviolence.	3	Direct		Military	Deter	Leaders, Loyalists		Hypothesis 6 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis implies that the United States should refrain from retaliating against every terrorist provocation to avoid entering a cyle of violence. This is because retaliaion itself can be provocative, mainly in sense of enraging civilian populations and thus leading to greater support for the VEO. Key implications are therefore to avoid over-reaction and collateral damage. Sensitivity to concerns about sovereignty and national pride may be important too, meaning that where possible, the United States should work with local police and military to implement its responses.
000077	Repression last month increases the likelihood of terrorist attacks this month; conciliatory actions last month decrease the likelihood.	7	Direct		Military	Deter	Leaders, Loyalists, Broader Audience		Hypothesis 7 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis would imply that efforts to address legitimate grievances and support peaceful alternative paths for political participation would be helpful, while short-sighted retaliation for VEO attacks might be counterproductive (backlash effect).
000088	Repression last month increases the likelihood of terrorist attacks this month; conciliatory actions last month decrease the likelihood. And the correlation actually gets stronger when the actions in question are indiscriminate--i.e., when they target a population rather than a person.	7	Direct		Military	Deter	Leaders, Loyalists, Broader Audience		Hypothesis 8 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis would imply that efforts to address legitimate grievances and support peaceful alternative paths for political participation would be helpful, while short-sighted retaliation for VEO attacks might be counterproductive (backlash effect). Most importantly, there is a need to avoid indiscriminate responses and perhaps even to adopt conciliatory policies toward the populations from which terrorist groups derive support.
000099	Increased severity of punishment for attacks deters VEOs from carrying out those attacks.	2	Direct	Military Deterrence/Coercion		Deter	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers, Ideological influencers, Material supporters	Coercion	Hypothesis 9 Implications: If valid, the hypothesis implies that a concerted effort at attack identification might be made and then a consistent and across the board punishment structure put into place with a well-considered, graduated plan of punishments of increasing severity. This favors a militarizedresponse, which could include greater use of tactics such as drones, covert raids and air strikes. Caveat: It is crucial that this be implemented consistently and as fairly as possible. Moreover, although escalation against a terrorist organization may be effective purely from the point of view of hurting the organization, mistakers are almost inevitable and escalation in the severity of punishments also increases the chances of collateral damage, which may lead to conversion of fence-sitting local populations. It is important to balance the risk of collateral damage with the pay-off of improved deterrence.
0001010	Harsh reprisals, including threats of death, severe sanctions, public humiliation, or the killing of family members, may deter VEOs from action.	2	Direct	Military Deterrence/Coercion	Military	Deter	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers, Ideological influencers, Material supporters	Coercion	Hypothesis 10 Implications: If valid, the hypothesis implies that harsh reprisals (including the use of VEO family members as bargaining chips) might be a useful element in coercive diplomacy with VEOs. A concerted effort at identification of elements that the VEO members value (including family members) might be undertaken and would then become targetable in the event of VEO attack. Caveats: Killing or detaining non-involved family members is highly problematic from a larger strategic perspective (and an ethical perspective as well). Also, reprisals do not occur in a vacuum; they must be considered in the context of their effects on "soft power," such as the ability to motivate other countries to participate in counter-terrorism collaboration. In any event, it is crucial that reprisals be implemented consistently and carefully, as the spill-over effects for mistakes in terms of U.S. strategic goals are potentially very severe. Lastly, reprisals may deter current VEO attacks but build capabilities at future points in time by motivating fence-sitting locals to join a terrorist organization. Therefore, there must always be a careful consideration of both benefits and risks and finding a balance between them.
0001111	As hard incentives (punishment) and soft incentives (rewards) for members to exit a VEO become more balanced, the chance of members deradicalizing or disengaging increases.	3	Direct	Military Deterrence/Coercion	Military		Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers, Ideological influencers, Material supporters, Broader audience	Coercion, Incentivize	Hypothesis 11 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis implies that "hard" and "soft" power (manifesting in incentives) must be balanced to increase the chances of deradicalization and/or disengagement and that only focusing on one or the other will fail. Comment: While there is an obvious tendency towards punishment of VEO members, counter-terrorism forces should also consider that there are a range of individuals in an organization; although the modal individual may respond to punishment, some smaller proportion will probably respond more to rewards.
0001212	When pressure from the state is high with no parallel inducements, Islamist VEOs will not deradicalize and vice versa.	3	Direct	Military Deterrence/Coercion	Military		Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers, Ideological influencers, Material supporters, Broader audiences	Coercion, Incentivize	Hypothesis 12 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis implies that punishment measures must be balanced by a focused policy of inducements. The hypothesis also suggests that "low" pressure/high inducements produces de-radicalization, but "low" is not the same as "zero" pressure - authorities must calibrate some level of pressure. The hypothesis also points to the need to tailor counter-terrorism efforts to the nature of the opposition - Islamists may respond differently than other groups. Caveat: Any inducements should be accompanied by general investments in the population so that VEO members are not seen to be benefitting from being their membership in the VEO.
0001313	Law enforcement and intelligence are more effective than military operations in lowering VEO activity.	2	Direct	Military Deterrence/Coercion	Military	Defeat	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers	Denial	Hypothesis 13 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis would suggest that effective counter-VEO efforts can reside outside military operations and therefore that the importance of intelligence and law enforcement agencies in challenging VEOs should be increased even further. While not necessarily an either/or choice, in that such an approach need not preclude the use of military force, the hypothesis would suggest that it will be important: 1) to involve intelligence and law enforcement in almost all counterterorism efforts, 2) to ensure that intelligence and law enforcement receive necessary resources, training, and high-level political support to carry out the mission, and 3) to break down stovepipes and have good communication and coordination across all government agencies. Comment: Future efforts to counter VEOs might consider law enforcement and intelligence operations as a first move, reserving military operations as a secondary option. In addition, greater efforts to work with the State Department and the Department of Justice on training foreign police forces in the democratic use of counter-VEO tactics, under 22 USC §2420 restrictions (which prohibits to a limited nature the training of foreign police forces), may be required. Efforts to focus on community involvement and low-level policing should be emphasized.
0001414	Lowering of widespread effective repression and societal control will increase VEO activity.	3	Direct	Military Deterrence/Coercion	Military			Incentivize	Hypothesis 14 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis would suggest that U.S. security policy should include components to strengthen the effectiveness of law enforcement and/or the military in partner countries. Controversially, the United States could turn a blind eye to repressive governments that use coerction to supress VEO activity. Another implication is that caution is indicated in newly democratizing states, because periods of transition are dangerous and policymakers should expect problems. Caveat: It is vital that the U.S. not be seen as encouraging human rights abuses in partner countries.
0001515	Deterrence will be enhanced if the government shows determination, that is, it is prepared to counter the VEOs in the long run; maintaining pressure is key.	4	Direct	Military Deterrence/Coercion	Military	Deter	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers, Ideological influencers, Material supporters	Coercion	Hypothesis 15 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis implies that the United States should develop a reputation for determination to defeat terrorism. This can be accomplished through public diplomacy, consistently strong action against terrorist groups, and potentially even the use of "trip wires" to lock us in to taking strong action against VEOs even when it might be in our short-term interest not to.
0001616	If the adversary perceives that the costs of action are acceptable, it will work against the deterring party.	3	Moderate confidence	Military Deterrence/Coercion	Military	Deter	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers, Ideological influencers, Material supporters	Coercion	Hypothesis 16 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis would suggest that any deterrent threat should make clear that the anticipated costs to a terrorist group for taking a proscribed action will be unacceptable.
0001717	Attempts at deterrence lead to increased VEO activity.	0	N/A	Military Deterrence/Coercion		Deter	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers, Broader audience	Coercion	Hypothesis 17 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis suggests that there is some risk of increased VEO activity associated with attempts to deter, i.e., that a deterrence strategy is not necessarily "low cost". This "Catch-22" potential should be taken into account before engaging in such a strategy. It also suggests that co-optation, "hearts and minds" and ameliorative strategies may be preferable to deterrence strategies in many cases.
0001818	Stopping VEOs from meeting "milestones" will decrease their lifespan.	2	Direct	Military Deterrence/Coercion	Military		Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers, Ideological influencers, Broader audience	Denial	Hypothesis 18 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis would suggest working hard to deny VEOs even limited success. Comment: Implementation requires data on milestones that matter to VEOs and/or their stakeholders. Caveat: Milestones could cut two ways so the context should be kept in mind - meeting milestones could could lend the group more prestige and power, but it might also lead the group to become less radical over time.
0001919	Increasing punishment of VEO members does not reduce VEO activity.	3	Direct	Military Deterrence/Coercion Direct Punishment	Military	Defeat	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers, Ideological influencers, Material supporters, Broader audience	Coercion	Hypothesis 19 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis implies that since the certainty of punishment, rather than the amount seems to have more of a role in influencing VEOs, influence strategies should focus on the former. As long as some punishment is meted out (the stick), any additional resources can be devoted to "soft" incentives, such as hearts and minds strategies, that can be used to disengage/deradicalize members (carrots).
0002020	VEO perception of targets' ability to attribute the attack in a timely manner may deter VEO activity.	0	N/A	Military Deterrence/Coercion Direct Punishment	Military	Deter	Leaders	Coercion	Hypothesis 20 Implications: If valid, the hypothesis would imply that the United States should focus on the timeliness of its attribution capability and when brodcasting those capabilities in its public messaging, this should be emphasized. Caveats: directly controlling VEO perceptions is rarely possible; in most instances, VEOs desire everyone to know who carried out the mission, so attribution would only be effective for VEOs that do not want to be identified.
0002121	VEO perception of targets' ability to attribute the attack in a timely manner with a high degree of certainty may deter VEO activity.	0	N/A	Military Deterrence/Coercion Direct Punishment	Military	Deter	Leaders	Coercion	Hypothesis 21 Implications: If valid, the hypothesis would imply that the United States should invest in, publically broadcast, and possibly even exaggerate the effectiveness of, its ability to attribute attacks rapidly and with a high degree of certainty. Caveats: directly controlling VEO perceptions is rarely possible and it is unclear what a sufficiently "high" degree of certainty would be to deter VEOs. This is likely to vastly complicate attempts to influence such a policy. Furthermore, in most instances, VEOs desire everyone to know who carried out the mission, so attribution would only be effective for VEOs that do not want to be identified.
0002222	Continually crushing VEOs deters future VEO formation and activities.	3	Direct	Military Deterrence/Coercion Direct Punishment Retaliate against VEO	Military	Destroy	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers	Coercion	Hypothesis 22 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis suggests that constant, high-impact militaristic countermeasures can hurt VEO capacity and reputation. Caveat: Extreme force could build sympathy for the VEOs and crushing might only work in certain situations where occupation is not required and the public can be separated from the VEO.
0002323	Targeted killings of mid-level terrorist operatives can have a deterrent effect by increasing the personal risks for those who plan and prepare terrorist attacks.	0	N/A	Military Deterrence/Coercion Direct Punishment Retaliate against VEO	Military	Deter	Loyalists	Coercion	Hypothesis 23 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis would imply that kinetic operations directed at certain parts of a VEO organization/network may have a deterrent effect. This suggests a supply-side approach, i.e., reducing attacks by reducing operative capable of generating such attacks and willing to do so. At the same time, it raises the importance of putting resources into intelligence, infiltration and special forces and indicates a focus on kinetic as opposed to non-kinetic operations. For the deterrent to work, the US must communicate its intent and maintain and broadcast its standards for prosecution. Comment: Identification becomes a central issue - what constitutes sufficient evidence to order a killing. Caveats: Killings may also lead to collateral damage that motivate fence-sitting individuals. Also, depending on the context, resource availability might overwhelm this influence tactic, as the senior leaders may be able to replace mid-level operatives as rapidly as they are eliminated.
0002424	Targeted assassination of leaders (decapitation) reduces VEO activity	2	Direct	Military Deterrence/Coercion Direct Punishment Retaliate against VEO	Military	Defeat	Leaders	Coercion	Hypothesis 24 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis implies an emphasis on targeting leadership for removal rather than foot soldiers or operational planners. The notion is that without guidance, the organization will fall apart when leadership is removed. If valid, it might be an influence strategy with relatively low cost and high benefit. Comments: any policy that focuses on decapitation requires increased investments in intelligence and special forces, especially in both human and technical means of killing that minimize collateral damage in order to minimize the chances that an act motivates potential followers. Caveat: the posibility for "blowback" should always be considered - killing leaders may remove them but lead to future violence against the U.S. if the killing generates collateral damage that motivates fence-sitters or creates a martyr that inspires others. Moreover, the decrease in activity might be only temporary if alternate leadership is available. Alos, this option must be considered in the context of other hypotheses - if the lifespan or frequency of attacks decreases but the group becomes more violent in its final phases (e.g., engagers in more mass-casualty attacks) then removal may be counter-productive as compared to other strategies that lead to gradual reduction of violence and eventually dissolution of the group.
0002525	Removal of the leader of a VEO leads to fragmentation and outbidding and escalation.	0	N/A	Military Deterrence/Coercion Direct Punishment Retaliate against VEO	Military	Defeat	Leaders	Coercion	Hypothesis 25 Implications: If valid, the hypothesis suggests that fragmentation needs to be considered before adopting a decapitation strategy. In some cases, the United States should not try to fragment groups into smaller units as this can lead to an increased risk of intense violence like suicide terrorism; however, in others fragmentation might be preferable to unity of the organization in terms of the VEO's strategic threat.
0002626	Killing political leaders leads to more backlash than killing operational leaders.	0	N/A	Military Deterrence/Coercion Direct Punishment Retaliate against VEO	Military	Defeat	Leaders	Coercion	Hypothesis 26 Implications: If valid, then the obvious implication is to preferentially target VEO actors operationally involved in violence, rather than political leaders. For example, in the case of the IRA, this this would mean targeting the bomb makers, but leaving members of Sinn Fein (the political wing) unharmed. Comment: this hypothesis might also suggest a strategy to separate political leaders from operational leaders, for example, by seeking to transition a political leader to a position of "statesman" in order to give the leader something to lose in terms of presitge and position.
0002727	If a VEO has widespread popular support, then killing the leader (decapitation) is less effective.	2	Direct	Military Deterrence/Coercion Direct Punishment Retaliate against VEO	Military	Defeat	Leaders	Coercion	Hypothesis 27 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis would caution the United States to assess how much popular support a VEO has before embarking on a strategy of decapitation. If the VEO has a strong base, decapitation could be avoided, if the VEO occupies a fringe social role, decapitation could be considered. This further implies the possibility of postponing the killing of VEO leaders and focusing on information operations and hearts and minds efforts until the VEO loses some degree of popular support. This may include a) building an alternate movement that can deliver social or economic goods to the group that currently supports the VEO or b) working to separate the VEO from the population by meeting legitmiate greivances.
0002828	Targeted killing will increase VEO activity.	3	Direct	Military Deterrence/Coercion Direct Punishment Retaliate against VEO	Military	Defeat	Loyalists, Active followers, Ideological influencers, Material supporters	Coercion	Hypothesis 28 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis implies that targeted killing of rank-and-file members should not be used except in the course of preventing specific attacks.
0002929	Constant attack by state forces will lead to a lowering of VEO activity.	1	Low confidence	Military Deterrence/Coercion Direct Punishment Retaliate against VEO	Military	Defeat	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers	Coercion	Hypothesis 29 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis would imply that, at least for VEOs designated as high priority, such organizations should not be allowed to have periods of rest or safe zones where they can regroup or plan future attacks. A lack of momentum in its activities is likely to hurt VEO capacity and reputation. The hypothesis would in turn imply either direct military engagement between the U.S. military and those VEOs, or the use of pressure (with threats of sanctions) or inducements on allies and/or states that are home to high-priority VEOs to engage those organizations with consistent military force. Essentially, this would also imply treating most VEOs like guerrillas/insurgents and pursuing leaders, logistics, safe havens, etc. while providing security to local populations (i.e., a COIN approach). Any such strategy would necessitate relatively high expenditures of resources (and probably "staying power") and also have high potential for blowback. Comment: If such a strategy were successful, it would be mainly due to attrition of the VEO's capabilities, rather than a direct influence on its willingness to act. Crushing can work in certain situations where occupation is not required and the public can be separated from the VEO. Caveats: extreme force could build sympathy for the VEOs, and thus be detrimental in the long-term if fence-sitting individuals eventually join the VEO due to collateral damage.
0003030	State use of legitimate and limited force is less likely to increase public support for VEO activity.	8	Moderate confidence	Military Deterrence/Coercion Direct Punishment Retaliate against VEO	Military, Law Enforcement	Defeat	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers	Coercion	Hypothesis 30 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis would suggest that the amount and type of force used against VEOs is important and that this must not transcend a contextual threshold if the objective is to avoid increased public support for the VEO. Generally, responses should be discriminate and proportionate given the nature of the preceding VEO attack, with a preference for capture over kill. Specifically, the contextual threshold can be established by obtaining local and extant definitions of "legitimate" and "limited" through popular engagement and/or polling. Conversely, indiscriminate or extreme force is likely to work in the VEO's favor.
0003131	Long term attrition (constant and successful) can wear down VEOs and lead to their failure.	6	Direct	Military Deterrence/Coercion Direct Punishment Retaliate against VEO	Military	Defeat	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers	Coercion	Hypothesis 31 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis implies that measures to influence VEOs cannot be short-term or sporadic. This often requires "staying power": sufficient personnel, equipment, and resources over an extended period and a maintenance of a continual pressure and engagement strategy (whether kinetic or non-kinetic) directed towards the VEO. Caveat: Such measures, if not implemented very carefully and discriminately, may be detrimental in the long term if fence-sitting individuals eventually join the VEO due to collateral damage.
0003232	Giving priority to countering political subversion rather than physical destruction of VEOs will be more effective in limiting VEO activity (long-term).	4	Direct	Military Deterrence/Coercion Direct Punishment Retaliate against VEO	Military	Destroy	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers, Ideological influencers, Material supporters	Deligitimize	Hypothesis 32 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis implies that the United States should devote more effort to countering political subversion (even though this is often tedious) than to physically attacking VEOs. It also implies that a state must not allow attacks to change its basic political structure.
0003333	Targeting and threatening local political goals of (potential) franchise VEOs can deter globally networked VEOs.	0	N/A	Military Deterrence/Coercion Direct Punishment Retaliate against VEO	Military	Deter	Leaders	Coercion	Hypothesis 33 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis would imply that a networked organization requires a networked response - the more countries coordinate their activities against a set of franchises, the more deterrent the effort should be. This should entail the development and demonstration of the capability to put local objectives at risk and probably requires agreement between relevant states on a common strategy. Another implication is that in certain circumstances concessions on the local level might be made in order to prevent the formation of international (or global) VEO networks.
0003434	Locally oriented VEOs can be deterred from joining global terrorist campaigns by threatening to hold their local objectives at risk.	4	Direct	Military Deterrence/Coercion Direct Punishment Retaliate against VEO	Military	Deter	Leaders	Coercion	Hypothesis 34 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis would imply a strategy that includes the development and demonstration of the capability to put local objectives at risk, which probably requires agreement between relevant states on a common strategy.
0003535	Counterinsurgency strategies that match the VEOs' strategies in terms of direct vs. indirect lead to reduced VEO success.	7	Direct	Military Deterrence/Coercion Direct Punishment Retaliate against VEO	Military	Deter	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers		Hypothesis 35 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis enjoins authorities to match the VEOs' strategies in terms of direct vs. indirect counterinsurgency. Moreover, if the VEO switches strategies then counterinsurgency strategies need to switch in response in the nature suggested by this hypothesis. Inappropriate force against a VEO can be counterproductive.
0003636	Broad-front strategies are more effective at lowering VEO activities than center-of-gravity strategies.	0	N/A	Military Deterrence/Coercion Direct Punishment Retaliate against VEO	Military		Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers		Hypothesis 36 Implications: If valid, the obvious implication of this hypothesis is to attack all parts of the VEO organization, leadership, foot soldiers, and supporters. Moreover, for VEOs that operate in or against multiple countries, this hypothesis implies that these countries coordinate their activities tightly. Comment: Broad front strategies might be less likely to increase VEO recruitment.
0003737	Widespread repression will reduce domestic VEO activity.	2	Direct	Military Deterrence/Coercion Direct Punishment Retaliate against community/society VEO claims to represent	Military, Law Enforcement	Defeat	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers, Ideological influencers, Material supporters, Broader audience	Coercion	Hypothesis 37 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis would indicate that restricting and repressing large segments of society that directly or indirectly support VEO activity might prove fruitful in reducing VEO activity. Further implications are to empower police, courts, and the central government to crack down on VEOs. Comment: In certain circumstances this approach does seem to work (e.g., Chechnya) but usually it does not. Caveats: Downside risks include the loss of the moral high ground, harm to the U.S. reputation as a supporter of democracy and civil liberties, a desire for revenge, and possible resentment against the United States for backing repressive regimes. Repression usually creates favorable conditions for the VEO and is less effective in the long term.
0003838	State use of force that causes civilian casualities among VEO constituents or community of identification aids VEO recruitment.	3	Direct	Military Deterrence/Coercion Direct Punishment Retaliate against community/society VEO claims to represent	Military, Law Enforcement	Defeat	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers, Ideological influencers, Material supporters, Broader audience	Coercion	Hypothesis 38 Implications: If valid, the hypothesis would imply that force should be used with circumspection. In other words, the United States should have restrictive rules of engagement and focus on influence operations that do not create civilian casualties, including avoiding indiscriminate retaliation. This in turn requires high confidence in the accuracy of information before initiating military action, and thus more human intelligence. Punishments involving diplomatic isolation, financial penalties, prison, etc. can minimize this problem.
0003939	Widespread government repression (e.g., torture, disappearances, extrajudicial killings, political imprisonment) will increase transnational VEO activity.	8	Direct	Military Deterrence/Coercion Direct Punishment Retaliate against community/society VEO claims to represent	Military, Law Enforcement	Defeat	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers, Ideological influencers, Material supporters, Broader audience	Coercion	Hypothesis 39 Implications: This hypothesis is similar to a previous one, but relates to transnational, as opposed to domestic, VEO activity. If valid, it implies that widespread repression (including torture, abuse, or extrajudicial measures - in fact any measures that impinge on physical integrity) should be avoided, as this ultimately tends to help VEOs. The transnational aspect implies that some coordination will be required among states involved (as importers or exporters) of VEO activity and that it is in the United States' interest to work to convince partner governments not to use widespread repression, and to be seen publicly upholding position against repression and torture.
0004040	Inconsistent application and levels of repression will lead to an increased level of VEO activity.	3	High confidence - Similar	Military Deterrence/Coercion Direct Punishment Retaliate against community/society VEO claims to represent	Military, Law Enforcement	Defeat	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers, Ideological influencers, Material supporters, Broader audience	Coercion	Hypothesis 40 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis implies that, if a state chooses to repress, it should do so consistently rather than having oscillating periods of repression and accommodation. It also implies that the govwernment should explain its approach publicly in a way that matches actual practice. Comment: Uneveness implies a weak or incompetent state that cannot signal effective deterrence.
0004141	Incompetent application of repression will lead to increased level of VEO activity.	3	Direct	Military Deterrence/Coercion Direct Punishment Retaliate against community/society VEO claims to represent	Military, Law Enforcement	Defeat	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers, Ideological influences, Material supporters, Broader audience	Coercion	Hypothesis 41 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis would seem to suggest that agents of repression should be well-trained and repression should not be applied by irregular or ill-trained forces. In the United States context, it would be important to have clear standards of conduct and good training of US personnel, consistency across different agencies of government, and efforts to build partner state capacities in standardizing harsh measures. Comment: Incompetence implies a weak state , which is the enemy of effective COIN and a fertile ground for VEO activity.
0004242	More oppression will lead to more VEO activity.	3	Direct	Military Deterrence/Coercion Direct Punishment Retaliate against community/society VEO claims to represent	Military, Law Enforcement	Defeat	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers, Ideological influencers, Material supporters, Broader audience	Coercion	Hypothesis 42 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis implies a linear relationship between levels of repression and VEO activity, in turn advocating for minimizing levels of repression. In other words, even if repression might work in certain circumstances, it is preferable to use non-lethal, non-repressive means to reduce VEO activity.
0004343	If "buyers" (meaning the audience the organization seeks to serve) find the social and/or political change on offer by the VEO too costly, VEOs will modify their behavior.	3	Direct	Military Deterrence/Coercion Direct Punishment Retaliate against community/society VEO claims to represent	Military	Deter	Broader Audience	Deligitimize	Hypothesis 43 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis suggests a need to market the “cost” of the change advocated by the VEO to the buyer audience in such a way that the audience will over value avoiding the cost. This might be acheived through public diplomacy, especially that which highlights the economic, psychological, and social costs of VEOs' violence. Comment: If the audience is popular, COIN forces can emphasize the costs imposed on the population through VEO activity. COIN forces can event create "artificial" costs by first providing public goods and services and then withdrawing them after a VEO attack. If the audience is supernatural, a respected interpreter must be found that can emphasize that the divine finds the costs too high.
0004444	Threatening retaliation against third-party enablers can help prevent terrorist organizations from obtaining needed resources.	0		Indirect Punishment	Military	Deter	Material Supporters		Hypothesis 44 Implications: If valid, an obvious implication would be that the United States should consider issuing a declaratory policy threatening to retaliate against terrorist enablers. Caveats: such efforts would only be plausible to the extent that enablers can be identified, which will likely prove diffcult in many cases. Moreover, in an increasingly globalized world, there are likely to be other sources for resources, making such measures partial solutions at most.
0004545	Investing in and publicizing forensic capabilities to identify the source of nuclear (or any WMD) materials used in an attack will decrease the likelihood of third parties supplying materials or allowing them to leak.	1	Direct	Indirect Punishment		Deter	Material Supporters		Hypothesis 45 Implications: If valid, the hypothesis would suggest that the United States should invest in, publically broadcast, and possibly even exaggerate the effectiveness of, its WMD forensics capabilities. Comment: Investing in this option might be attractive to policymakers because it is low-risk.
0004646	Breaking VEO networks and connections can reduce VEO activity.	3	Direct	Military Deterrence/Coercion Indirect Punishment		Defeat	Material Supporters, State-based support	Denial	Hypothesis 46 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis would imply that substantial efforts hsould be made to break VEO network connections by, e.g., removing the most important nodes from the network. This in turn implies a need for increased resourses for intelligence and special forces and a development of an ongoing ability to track VEO networks and connections, as well as an effort to empirically study what factors lead to the breakup of networks, with a particular focus on those factors that are open to manipulation by blue forces.
0004747	Breaking VEO networks and connections will reduce VEO activity in the short term only, if at all.	0	N/A	Military Deterrence/Coercion Indirect Punishment		Defeat	Material Supporters, State-based support	Denial	Hypothesis 47 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis would imply that breaking networks will provide only tactical counter-VEO gain and that other mechainsms will be more important for a long-term counterterrorism strategy (such as trying to win larger population over and direct attacks against the VEO).
0004848	Breaking VEO networks and connections will reduce VEO activity in both the short and long term.	0	N/A	Military Deterrence/Coercion Indirect Punishment	Law Enforcement	Defeat	Material Supporters, State-based support	Denial	Hypothesis 48 Implications: If valid, the obvious implication of this hypothesis is that breaking the networking roots of terror is an effective means of controlling VEOs and the United States should seek to break VEO network connections by, e.g., removing the most important nodes from the network.
0004949	State targeting of actors in the VEO support system will have little effect because networks can repair or replace themselves very quickly.	2	Direct	Military Deterrence/Coercion Indirect Punishment		Defeat	Material Supporters, State-based support	Coercion	Hypothesis 49 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis would imply that breaking supplier networks (including by targeting actors in these supplier networks) will not be helpful and that other mechainsms will be more important for a long-term counter-VEO strategy (such as trying to win larger population over and direct attacks against the VEO).
0005050	The threatened or actual use of force against state sponsors will influence the behavior of VEOs.	1	Direct	Indirect Punishment Against state sponsors/enablers	Military		State-based Support		Hypothesis 50 Implications: Since this hypothesis does not relate to how the use of force will influence state sponsors or VEOs - whether it would encourage or discourage their activities - the only analytical implications would be that state sponsors present a potential source of leverage for influencing VEOs, but one that must be approached judiciously. Caveat: state sponsors of VEOs are often failed or failing states (e.g., Afghanistan) that probably lack the capacity to effectively control VEO activity within their borders, thus limiting their role in influence operations directed towards VEOs.
0005151	Threatening punishment against state actors who sponsor or support VEOs will decrease that support and thereby reduce the operational capacity of the sponsored VEOs.	1	Direct	Indirect Punishment Against state sponsors/enablers	Military	Deter	State-based Support		Hypothesis 51 Implications: If valid, the obvious implication is that the United States might threaten punishment against states that sponor terrorism as part of its counter-VEO efforts. Caveats: This is plausible only to the extent that VEOs rely on states for resources and support, which may be an unfounded assumption because VEOs have shown an aptitude for securing resources in a number of ways. In addition, several studies have shown that the use of force against states (e.g., Libya) increases violence. Israeli force and threats of force against Syria and Iran over the years has failed to solve the problem of state-sponsorship, although it is conceivable that in the absence of Israeli action, Iranian and Syrian material support for terrorism would have been even greater. The Israeli-Iranian case is illustrative. It is difficult to demonstrate empirically, but Israeli commitment to punish Iran may have checked Iranian support to VEOs, which may constitute an example of cumulative deterrence. Lastly, the hypothesis does not specify what type or severity of force should be threatened.
0005252	Engaging in preventive or preemptive use of force against state sponsors of VEOs will deter the targeted and other states from sponsoring groups and thereby reduce the operational capacity of the sponsored VEOs.	1	Direct	Indirect Punishment Against state sponsors/enablers	Military		State-based Support		Hypothesis 52 Implications: If valid, an obvious implication is that the United States should in some circumstances consider using force preventively and preemptively against state sponsors of terrorism. Caveats: as already mentioned, states often cannot effectively control VEOs and force can be counter-productive as it might improve VEO recruitment (at the same time, Israel has arguably achieved success from its preemptive strikes in Syria and Iran). Lastly, the hypothesis does not specify what type or severity of force should be used.
0005353	Threatening punishment (up to and including the retaliatory use of WMD) against states will deter them from transferring or allowing negligent transfer of WMD to VEOs.	1	Direct	Indirect Punishment Against state sponsors/enablers	Military	Deter	State-based Support		Hypothesis 53 Implications: If valid, this would imply that the United States should issue a declaratory policy stating that it will use force, including possibly nuclear weapons, against states that transfer WMD to terrorist groups or through their negligence allow terrorist groups to acquire WMD. Caveat: the hypothesis does not suggest what the content of the threat should be. Also, such a policy would depend on reliable and transparent attribution capabilities. Comment: It would be difficult to demonstrate that states have 'allowed' WMDs to fall into hands of VEOs. Holding failing/failed states responsible for VEOs within their borders is thus a justifiable response.
0005454	Threatening automatic retaliation against any state that allows WMD materials to fall into the hands of VEOs can decrease the likelihood that the state will cooperate after an attack to track who obtained the WMD materials, and this increases the probability of follow-on terrorist attacks.	1	Direct	Indirect Punishment Against state sponsors/enablers	Military	Deter	State-based Support		Hypothesis 54 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis would suggest a more nuanced approach than implied by the previous hypothesis. In its declaratory policy, the United States should not threaten automatic retaliation, but distinguish between states that knowingly transfer WMD to terrorists and those that unwittingly allow WMD to fall into terrorists hands. Tough punishment might be threatened for the former, but the costs of reduced cooperation in the event of terrorist WMD acquisition against the benefits of compelling increased physical security should be carefull weighed for the latter. Caveat: Such a policy would depend on reliable and transparent attribution capabilities.
0005555	Communicating and publicizing attribution capabilities and programs to state actors can deter support to VEO WMD acquisition.	0		Indirect Punishment Against state sponsors/enablers	Information	Deter	State-based Support		Hypothesis 55 Implications: If valid, the hypothesis would suggest that the United States should invest in WMD forensics capabilities, and either privately or publically convey these capabilities to certain high-risk state actors. The U.S. might possibly even exaggerate the effectiveness of its WMD forensics capabilities. Comment: Investing in this option might be attractive to policymakers because it is low-risk.
0005656	Retaliation against foreign targets for VEO attacks against the US increases VEO activity.	8	Direct	Military Deterrence/Coercion Indirect Punishment Against state sponsors/enablers	Military	Deter	State-based Support	Coercion	Hypothesis 56 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis highlights the need to weigh costs of retaliating versus not retaliating in terms of increased VEO activity versus loss of deterrence credibility. This hypothesis suggests it would be wise to avoid blanket assumption that every VEO attack requires a military retaliation. Caveat: This hypothesis requires further specification of the conditions under which it might be true.
0005757	Preemptively targeting private, non-state enablers (e.g. financiers) may deter the provision of support terrorists need to carry out operations.	1		Indirect Punishment Against private supporters/enablers	Military, Law Enforcement		Material Supporters		Hypothesis 57 Implications: If valid, the hypothesis implies that the United States should preemptively target non-state VEO enablers, such as financiers, in order to deter future enablement by others. Caveat: the hypothesis rests on the uncertain assumption that preemption against non-state third parties would reduce resources. Comment: It would make sense to target potential financiers through investigation and law enforcement measures, since this is a relatively low-risk option. For example, cutting the flow of money to the Tamil Tigers seemed to help lead to their demise.
0005858	Retaliating (post attack) against non-state supporters and enablers of terrorism may deter the future provision of support or facilitation of terrorist organizations by such actors.	0		Indirect Punishment Against private supporters/enablers	Military, Law Enforcement	Deter	Material Supporters		Hypothesis 58 Implications: If valid, the hypothesis implies that, following a succesful terrorist attack, the United States should retaliate against non-state enablers of the attack to deter future terrorism. Caveat: This is only plausible to the extent that VEOs rely on such enablers for resources and support and cannot find alternative sources of resources.
0005959	"Get tough laws" will be ineffective in reducing VEO activity.	5	Direct		Law Enforcement	Deter	Leaders, Loyalists		Hypothesis 59 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis would suggest that it would be unwise to pursue broad legislation focused on criminal justice punishment. Rather, resources should be put into other polices (presumably focused on increasing security for the population and increasing their quality of life). Caveat: "Get tough" laws may be effective in deterring the formation of new VEOs even if current VEOs are not deterred.
0006060	Reducing the anticipated benefits or likelihood of success of an attack can deter VEOs.	2	Direct	Non-military Deterrence/Coercion Denial Strategic	Information	Dissuade	Leaders	Denial	Hypothesis 60 Implications: If valid (and the evidence is mixed), this hypothesis implies, most generally, that VEOs are less likely to take unreasonable risks and that barriers to success should be maximized. As such it suggests that the United States should embark upon a number of measures in the realm of homeland defense and public diplomacy to convince VEOs that terrorist attacks are unlikely to succeed and, if they do succeed, that the perpetrators are not likely to enjoy the expected benefits from them. Caveat: VEOs may turn to other targets and methods to circumvent barriers, but this should not dampen the resolve to make it difficult for them.
0006161	Using measures to manage and mitigate the consequences of an attack and to speed recovery afterward can deter terrorists by showing that even successful terrorist attacks will not produce large-scale effects.	0	N/A	Non-military Deterrence/Coercion Denial Strategic	Information, Military, Economic	Be seen as able to defend	Leaders	Denial	Hypothesis 61 Implications: If valid, the hypothesis would suggest that the United States should emphasize the development of a culture of resiliency - an ability to quickly bounce back from VEO attacks - and broadcast the existence of this national trait to maximize its deterrent effect.
0006262	Cultivating doubt as to whether, even if operationally successful, the ultimate goals of the VEO in conducting attacks will be achieved, deters the VEO from engaging in violence.	0	N/A	Non-military Deterrence/Coercion Denial Strategic	Information	Be seen as able to defend	Leaders	Denial	Hypothesis 62 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis suggests the need for creating a perception of fortitude. With respect to deterrence by punishment, this would entail developing a credible commitment strategy (such as the long-term commitment of troop resources to a counterinsurgency effort), while with respect to deterrence by denial this entails investments in developing societal resilience. In either case, a unified and effective messaging strategy is needed, for example, to highlight the recovery from attacks, as media focuses primarily on the initial attack rather than the lack of efficacy long-term. Comment: Tactical deterrence by denial is easier to implement but often just shifts the mode and target of attacks.
0006363	Greater social resilience bolsters deterrence by denial.	1	Direct	Non-military Deterrence/Coercion Denial Strategic	Information	Be seen as able to defend	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers	Denial	Hypothesis 63 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis implies that the United States should seek to develop a reputation for societal resilience and to broadcast that ability to our adversaries. For example, the United States should seek to return to normal societal functioning immediately after attacks and reclaim public space as soon as it has been violated. Involving the public in deterrence by denial has great potential.
0006464	Reducing the anticipated level of publicity of an attack can help deter VEOs from carrying out that attack.	0	N/A	Non-military Deterrence/Coercion Denial Operational	Information	Dissuade	Leaders	Denial	Hypothesis 64 Implications: If valid, the hypothesis would suggest that the United States should put in place strategies to reduce publicity awarded VEO attacks. Caveat: the nature of such strategies is not specified; also, reduced media attention might thwart VEOs but could also cause them to become more extreme. In addition, not all VEOs seek credit for their attacks. Comment: Suggested methods to reduce levels of publicity include (controversially) private-public partnerships to limit media coverage of terrorism as well as the broadcast of these policies to maximize their deterrent effect.
0006565	Reducing the anticipated reputational benefits of an attack can help deter VEOs from carrying out that attack.	0	N/A	Non-military Deterrence/Coercion Denial Operational	Information	Dissuade	Leaders	Denial	Hypothesis 65 Implications: If valid, the hypothesis would suggest that the United States should identify the potential reputational benefits that accrue to VEOs from a succesful attack and act to reduce these. It should also broadcast its ability and willingness to do so. Caveat: the hypothesis does not specify the means of denying reputational benefits. Comment: Anything that will reduce the probability of operational success and media attention will likely cut into the reputation of the VEO.
0006666	Increased uncertainty about the ability to control the effects of biological weapons makes VEOs less likely to use them.	0	N/A	Non-military Deterrence/Coercion Denial Operational	Information	Raise risks and uncertainties	Leaders	Denial	Hypothesis 66 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis implies that investment in information operations focused on CBRN and the dangers and uncontrollable nature of biological weapons in particular might have a deterrent effect. Caveat: The hypothesis must be considered in the context of the organzation's ideology, geographic location, and target location. Lack of control over effects may matter only if the VEO is in danger of "fouling its nest" or killing (potential) adherents.
0006767	Media focus on VEO activity can increase VEO activity.	2	Direct	Non-military Deterrence/Coercion Denial Operational	Information	Dissuade	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers, Ideological influencers, Material supporters	Denial	Hypothesis 67 Implications: Even if valid and media attention can spur copycat or followon attacks, this hypothesis does not provide many actionable implications, especially for the United States, since media censorship in Western democracies is unlikely. However, a strategy to shape the nature of the media's response to VEO activity might be more feasible, for example, encouraging a greater focus on the effects of activities that are considered illegitimate and providing the media with more information on the response to VEO attacks rather than the attacks themselves to demonstate resilience.
0006868	Reducing the media's contribution to the perceived visibility of attacks increases deterrence.	2	Direct	Non-military Deterrence/Coercion Denial Operational	Information	Dissuade	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers, Ideological influencers, Material supporters	Denial	Hypothesis 68 Implications: If valid, the hypothesis implies that there may be some scope for influencing VEO activity if media content can be adjusted, for instance encouraging a focus on the effects of and responses to VEO attacks and highlighting resilience to VEO activity. Another possible implication is that the perceived visibility of attacks to the VEO's core membership might be interrupted via disruption of Internet access, seeking to incarcerate spokespeople, etc.
0006969	Content of media attention influences VEOs.	8	Direct	Non-military Deterrence/Coercion Denial Operational	Information		Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers, Ideological influencers, Material supporters, Broader audience, Other populations	Denial	Hypothesis 69 Implications: If valid, the primary implication of the hypothesis concerns the United States government (USG) message, which should highlight the ineffectiveness of terrrorism, its moral wrongness, its unintended victims (e.g. fellow Muslims killed by AQ attacks) in order to dilute and counteract the VEO's own message. Another implication is that certain tactical and operational details of VEO attacks or countermeasures should be kept secret, in order not to encourage copycats. It may also be possible to enter into dialogue with the media regarding the impact of the content purveyed by providing evidence of the relationship between media content and VEO activity. Lastly, it may be possible to interrupt the VEO's access to the media - via disruption of Internet access, seeking to incarcerate spokespeople, etc.
0007070	Media shaming of VEO activity can reduce VEO activity.	0	N/A	Non-military Deterrence/Coercion Denial Operational	Information	Dissuade	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers, Ideological influencers, Material supporters, Broader audience, Other populations	Denial	Hypothesis 70 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis would have only indirect implications because it is almost impossible to control media content in democracies with any degree of reliability. However, inofrmation campaigns to depict VEOs as criminals rather than political operatives or rebels might be effective. Comment: in countries with less emphasis on freedom of the press, it might be possible to cultivate media sources that have a demonstrated editorial bias against VEO activity.
0007171	Media reports countering discrimination or demonization of VEO and/or its constituency can reduce VEO activity.	0	N/A	Non-military Deterrence/Coercion Denial Operational	Information	Induce	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers, Ideological influencers, Material supporters, Broader audience, Other populations	Denial	Hypothesis 71 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis would have only indirect implications because it is almost impossible to control media content in democracies with any degree of reliability. However, it suggests that counter-VEO authorities might propose a media narrative that separates the grievance from the VEO's actions by supporting the legitimate greivances of groups while demonizing VEO activity. Such a strategy may also wish to establish a clear delineation of what constitutes "normal politics" for groups and VEOs, i.e., political activity that will be tolerated and political activity that will generate a repressive response.
0007272	Lack of press freedom can retard state efforts to influence VEOs.	1	Direct	Non-military Deterrence/Coercion Denial Operational	Information	Persuade	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers, Ideological influencers, Material supporters, Broader audience, Other populations	Incentivize	Hypothesis 72 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis suggests avoiding censorship and supporting press freedom. In the absence of a free press, VEOs have no independent way to verify government claims, which can undermine government signaling and other outreach efforts. There may be no substitute for a free press, but if the problem is lack of external verification of government activity, there may be a trusted third party (UN, third country, etc.) that may be able to play the role.
0007373	Applying better defensive measures to targets, even if imperfect, can help deter VEO attacks on those targets by decreasing the likelihood of mission success for risk averse members and group members or by increasing the uncertainty of carrying out a successful attack.	3	Direct	Non-military Deterrence/Coercion Denial Tactical	Information	Be seen as able to defend	Leaders	Denial	Hypothesis 73 Implications: If valid, the hypothesis implies that anything that lowers the probability of success will thereby reduce the probability of an attack. Therefore, the United States should enhance its defenses around likely terrorist targets and demonstrate that these defenses are both strong and capable. Caveat: this would only apply in those cases where the VEOs are rational actors who wish to succeed operationally as well as strategically.
0007474	Metal detectors and increased law enforcement at airports decreases hijackings.	9	Direct	Non-military Deterrence/Coercion Denial Tactical	Law Enforcement	Raise risks and uncertainties	Leaders	Denial	Hypothesis 74 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis suggests that these measures be maintained and expanded as far as hijacking is viewed as a threat.
0007575	Visible variability in prevention measures is particularly effective for the effect of applying better defensive measures to targets.	0	N/A	Non-military Deterrence/Coercion Denial Tactical	Law Enforcement	Be seen as able to defend	Leaders, Loyalists	Denial	Hypothesis 75 Implications: If valid, the hypothesis implies that not only should the United States enhance its defenses around likely terrorist targets, but it should ensure that such defenses are varied and, more importantly, seen to be variable, in order to increase the uncertainty faced by any VEO attacker. Caveat: this would only apply in those cases where the VEOs are rational actors who wish to succeed operationally as well as strategically.
0007676	Reducing the anticipated physical damage (direct and indirect) of an attack can help deter VEOs from carrying out that attack.	0	N/A	Non-military Deterrence/Coercion Denial Tactical	Law Enforcement, Military, Economic	Be seen as able to defend	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers	Denial	Hypothesis 76 Implications: If valid, the obvious implication is that the United States should take steps to reduce the likely damage that would result from a variety of different types of terrorist attacks and broadcast its ability and intention to limit the physical damage from an attack. Comment: this interacts with several related hypotheses, forexample, reduced damage could also attract less media attention and damage the VEO's reputation.
0007777	Targeting family members by suppressing financial compensation from suicide terror missions may deter individuals in a VEO from conceptualizing a positivie risk-benefit ratio.	0	N/A	Non-military Deterrence/Coercion Denial Tactical	Financial	Dissuade	Loyalists	Coercion	Hypothesis 77 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis would suggest that the United States should act to supress any financial compensation reaching family members of suicide terrorists and should broadcast its ability and willingness to do so (Israel has achieved some success by convincing family members they will be punished).
0007878	Effective lower level policing (e.g. community level policing) can lower VEO activity.	1	Moderate confidence	Non-military Deterrence/Coercion Denial Tactical	Law Enforcement	Persuade	Broader Audience	Denial	Hypothesis 78 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis would suggest empowering local police instead of national police forces, which would emphasize giving necessary resources and training to local law enforcement, and finding ways to encourage local communities to cooperate with them. It would also suggest focusing on gathering information and getting people to denounce members in VEOs. Through the difficult (yet necessary if this hypothesis is true) inclusion of community members in the formation and implementation of counter-VEO operations, DOD could build additional intelligence capacity among the community members. The more legitimate the counter-VEO operation is viewed by community members, the more likely that these members will participate in the identification and extraction of members of VEOs from their community. Caveats: The success of such an aproach will likely require avoiding racial profiling or broad rhetoric denouncing whole religions or ethnicities, etc. Furthermore, in cooperating with local law enforcement to counter VEOs, military personnel need to consider the method of arrest and cooperation used by the law enforcement agency as an important component of these partnerships. Methods that are overly harsh and brutal may increase the potential recruiting opportunities for terrorist groups in these areas, leading to backlash attacks. Lastly, historical patterns of policing within these areas will need to be considered prior to the effective use of community-based policing, as many of these communities may be wary of the police given prior acts of indiscriminate violence or corruption on the part of the police.
0007979	Development of human intelligence can lower VEO threat.	3	Direct	Non-military Deterrence/Coercion Denial Tactical	Law Enforcement	Defeat	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers	Denial	Hypothesis 79 Implications: If valid, the primary implication of this hypothesis is to continue to invest in developing the capacity for human intelligence, while simultaneously developing effective means for cataloging, compling, and analyzing this intelligence. This may require resource transfers from hi-tech intelligence collection (often SIGINT, MASINT or IMINT) to HUMINT. Information is essential in counter-VEO operations to distinguish between community member and terrorist. Therefore, law enforcement and intelligence operations need to be able to infiltrate violent organizations by using informants, incentivizing defections, and placing operatives inside these networks.
0008080	Strategic deterrence by denial is more important than tactical denial because VEOs may accept a few tactical failures if they believe their ultimate objectives are still achievable.	1	Direct	Non-military Deterrence/Coercion Denial	Information	Be seen as able to defend	Leaders	Denial	Hypothesis 80 Implications: If valid, one implication is that policy should focus on strategic level deterrence by denial with less focus on tactical issues. Caveats: determining and deterring the strategic goals of VEOs is difficult. Moreover, implementation of such an approach would be problematic, since strategic level goals are often built on tactical level behavior.
0008181	Targeting foot soldiers with arrest and long-term, isolated punishment may deter individual VEO action as they perceive such to be greater deterrent than death.	0	N/A	Non-military Deterrence/Coercion Alternative (non-military) Punishment Threats	Law Enforcement	Deter	Active Followers	Coercion	Hypothesis 81 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis indicates an emphasis on developing capture over kill tactics at the operational level and producing the widespread capacity for long-term, isolated punishment. In this way, mass arrests might be used to both reduce the supply of operatives able to use terrorism and to deter people from joining the VEO movement in future. Caveat: depending on the context, resource availability might overwhelm this influence tactic, as the senior leaders may be able to replace low-level operatives as rapidly as they are eliminated.
0008282	Arresting a VEO leader is a more effective means of influencing the VEO than killing him.	1	Direct	Non-military Deterrence/Coercion Alternative (non-military) Punishment Threats	Law Enforcement	Defeat	Leaders	Coercion	Hypothesis 82 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis implies that, when attempting to neutralize the leadership of a group, capturing rather than killing is preferred in order to reduce second order effects or blowback. Comment: An emphasis on developing capture over kill tactics at the operational level most likely entails increased resources for intelligence and special forces. It also requires planning to assure that the captured leader is unable to communicate through others or the press, i.e., a plan for inprisonment that separates and is viewed as legitimate by boththe population and the international community.
0008383	Imprisonment of leaders leads to increased VEO activity.	2	Direct	Non-military Deterrence/Coercion Alternative (non-military) Punishment Threats	Law Enforcement	Defeat	Leaders	Coercion	Hypothesis 83 Implications: If valid, the hypothesis suggests that, rather than apprehend the leadership of a group, the United States should either eliminate or ignore them when influencing the behavior of the organization. Comment: this hypothesis must be considered in light of others. For example, if killing the leader decreases VEO activity, then a policy of killing clearly dominates. If both killing and arrest lead to increased VEO activity, then ameliorative/conciliatory policies may be the only option, if legitimate and viable.
0008484	Discouraging state support for schools teaching radical ideologies will reduce VEO activity.	0	N/A	Non-military Deterrence/Coercion Alternative (non-military) Punishment Threats Financial Sanctions	Financial	Dissuade	Ideological influencers	Deligitimize	Hypothesis 84 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis would suggest that the United States might develop an international strategy to counter the teaching of radical ideologies in schools in countries that give rise to terrorism. This might be achieved by provising aid for secular schools and removing aid when radical religious schools receive support. Caveat: There is not a tremendous amount of state support for these schools in many cases, so such a policy may be limited.
0008585	Inability to block external assistance leads to more VEO activity.	3	Direct	Non-military Deterrence/Coercion Alternative (non-military) Punishment Threats Financial Sanctions	Financial	Deter	Material Supporters, State-based support	Denial	Hypothesis 85 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis would suggest that robust counter-terrorist financing efforts, border controls, export controls, and immigration controls are all important components in the overall effort to reduce VEO activity.
0008686	Blocking VEO financial transactions will curtail VEO activity.	0	N/A	Non-military Deterrence/Coercion Alternative (non-military) Punishment Threats Financial Sanctions	Financial	Deter	Material Supporters, State-based support	Denial	Hypothesis 86 Implications: If valid, the obvious implication of this hypothesis is that the United States must maintain a robust counter-terrorist financing capability. Comment: The key future concern in this space is the rapidly proliferating systems of non-bank financial flows, for example, Linden dollars in the Second Life virtual space.
0008787	Increased apprehension of members can decrease VEO activity.	7	Direct	Non-military Deterrence/Coercion Alternative (non-military) Punishment Threats Legal	Law Enforcement	Defeat	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers, Ideological influencers, Material supporters	Coercion	Hypothesis 87 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis would imply that imprisoning VEO operatives can be preferable to killing them, since they can be a source for intelligence and lead to more arrests. This would translate into a focus on regular infantry counterinsurgency efforts and a capture over kill approach, but would also require investment in intelligence and forces that can capture without using lethal force. As such, this might mean avoiding large-scale use of military force that would kill terrorists or create conditions that make it harder to capture and arrest them. It would also translate into empowering police forces and mean that efforts to infuence VEOs should include cooperative efforts with traditional law enforcement entities within the location of the operations. Comment: If followed, there must be a plan for imprisonment that separates VEO members from society and from the other prisoners susceptible to being "converted". Also, avoid using illegal interrogation methods on captured terror suspects. While the hypothesis refers to arrests for suspected terrorist activity, other measures of arrests (for petty, financial, organized, and transnational crimes) could also serve to weaken VEO operational capacity by removing indidividuals from these organizations without the thorny implications of targeted assassinations or controversial legal statutes.
0008888	Concessions to VEOs do not increase VEO attacks.	2	Direct	Negotiations	Diplomatic	Induce	Leaders, Loyalists		Hypothesis 88 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis implies that offering concessions to VEOs to bring them into the political process, instead of resolutely refusing to negotiate, can be appropriate. When performing analysis of such concessions, it may thus be necessary to lower the perceived costs associated with them. Caveat: This needs to be balanced with the possibility that concessions can also alienate current supporters of the United States and may have negative spillover effects that need to be considered.
0008989	Engagement with VEOs in negotiations reduces violence.	2	Direct	Bargaining/Negotiations/Dialogue Negotiations Negotiations with VEO as a whole	Diplomatic	Induce	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers	Incentivize	Hypothesis 89 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis suggests that states should treat VEOs as political actors and encourage political debate. This includes allowing them to form political parties, and giving them access to credible institutions like a free and fair judiciary system. Comment: Priority should be placed on developing informal and third party links with VEOs. Caveat: The concessions that may result from negotiations might prove to be painful or unsustainable, and a break-off of negotiations could lead to a spike in violence.
0009090	Only good faith, substantive engagement with VEOs in negotiations reduces violence.	0	N/A	Bargaining/Negotiations/Dialogue Negotiations Negotiations with VEO as a whole	Diplomatic	Induce	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers	Incentivize	Hypothesis 90 Implications: If valid, the obvious implication is that if a state does negotiate, it should do so in good faith and be ready to offer substantive concessions. This usually entails acknowledging VEO grievances and working to remedy, within reason, some of their negotiable claims.
0009191	In a domestic context, VEOs agree to negotiate if they can preserve their reputation (e.g., not be seen to lose) and there are credible guarantees that the government will not double-cross them.	0	N/A	Bargaining/Negotiations/Dialogue Negotiations Negotiations with VEO as a whole	Diplomatic	Induce	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers	Incentivize	Hypothesis 91 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis implies that it is important to show VEO leaders a certain level of respect and to offer credible assurances the VEO won't be attacked or repressed if it stops violence and negotiates in good faith. This can be as simple as guaranteeing safe passage for leaders if they come to negotiating table or as complex as agreeing to negotiate with VEOs without asking them to lay down their arms (in most cases, since states monopolize violence, any agreement made between parties is unlikely to be trusted without a credible threat of force from each party).
0009292	It is generally in the government's best interest to negotiate with VEOs only when the group is gaining momentum.	0	N/A	Bargaining/Negotiations/Dialogue Negotiations Negotiations with VEO as a whole	Diplomatic	Induce	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers	Incentivize	Hypothesis 92 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis suggests that negotiations should be held when group is gaining momentum and not when the group has reached stasis or if it is declining. It might also imply that if a group is strategically weak, repression can be used. Comment: For this to be meaningful, it is important to develop concrete empirical criteria for measuring momentum.
0009393	VEOs are more likely to negotiate when they see themselves 'losing ground' (e.g., PLO)	0	N/A	Bargaining/Negotiations/Dialogue Negotiations Negotiations with VEO as a whole	Diplomatic	Induce	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers	Incentivize	Hypothesis 93 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis implies that a VEO’s agreement to negotiate might signal strategic weakness. Governments could therefore periodically ask for negotiations in order to probe the relative position of their adversary. Another possible implication is that coercive efforts to put VEOs on defensive may need to precede negotiations.
0009494	Negotiations with VEOs can benefit from third party involvement as mediators or guarantors.	0	N/A	Bargaining/Negotiations/Dialogue Negotiations Negotiations with VEO as a whole	Diplomatic	Induce	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers	Incentivize	Hypothesis 94 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis suggests following a policy of developing third party mediators and grooming possible intermediaries, together with an effort to include such actors in any negotiations. At the international level, this also implies involving states that both sides trust or international organizations to monitor peace agreements between states and VEOs. A less direct implication is that it is wise to avoid alienating third parties whose later assistance might be valuable.
0009595	Negotiating with VEOs can lead to more terror as a result of spoilers.	8	Direct	Bargaining/Negotiations/Dialogue Negotiations Negotiations with VEO as a whole	Diplomatic	Induce	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers	Incentivize	Hypothesis 95 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis suggests that the presence of "spoilers" needs to factor in to the decision to negotiate with VEOs. A cost benefit analysis needs to be done relating to the benefits of neutralizing violence from one VEO (which may have a strategic impact) against encouraging terrorism on the part of spoilers (which may have a tactical impact). Advance planning for how to deal with spoiler problem will thus be advisable when negotations are pursued. Simplistic guidance that might be drawn from this is to refrain from negotiating with VEOs when facing multiple adversaries, but to negotiate when facing one fairly homogenous adversary. Caveat: Negotiations might still make sense if there are "moderates" who can bring most of the VEOs into peaceful settlement.
0009696	Negotiations do not lead to the demise of the VEO.	3	Direct	Bargaining/Negotiations/Dialogue Negotiations Negotiations with VEO as a whole	Diplomatic	Induce	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers	Incentivize	Hypothesis 96 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis would imply that unless negotiations provide some type of information for the state, they will not be useful in defeating the VEO. However, if negotiations can lead to a lessening of violence or a change in the nature of the VEO, then it makes sense to negotiate. If not, then more kinetic efforts directed at the VEO should be pursued along with efforts aimed at winning the larger population away from the VEO.
0009797	Amnesty offered to VEO members can lead to desertions and weakening of the group.	3	Direct	Bargaining/Negotiations/Dialogue Negotiations Negotiations with VEO as a whole	Diplomatic, Law enforcement	Induce	Active followers	Incentivize	Hypothesis 97 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis suggests providing avenues for VEO members who renounce violence to disengage under appropriate conditions without harsh reprisals, thus encouraging defection and encouraging denunciation. A policy of amnesty could be instituted with sufficient support so that members are not incentivized to go back to the VEO.
0009898	In a country/issue context with multiple VEOs, negotiating with one VEO may lead to increased bad behavior by VEOs left out of negotiations.	9	Direct	Bargaining/Negotiations/Dialogue Negotiations Negotiations with VEO as a whole	Diplomatic	Co-opt	Leaders	Incentivize	Hypothesis 98 Implications: If valid, one implication of this hypothesis is that when facing multiple VEOs, the state should not necessarily negotiate publicly. Another implication is that consideration should be given to negotiating with multiple VEOs or at least those that have serious “market share”. Comment: This does not imply that the state should refrain from negotiating, but rather that the state should engage in thinking and planning ahead for how to address problem of spoilers.
0009999	Opening up debate, irrespective of its impact on the prevalence of anti-Western sentiment, may reduce support for VEOs.	1	Direct	Bargaining/Negotiations/Dialogue Dialogue Promote dialog among groups	Diplomatic	Co-opt	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers, Ideological influencers, Material supporters, Broader audience, Other populations	Incentivize	Hypothesis 99 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis implies a strategy that relies on a moderated dialogue where grievances may be discussed so long as violence is not endorsed or employed. This constitutes a low-risk option that could be beneficial. Caveat: This would require an agreement between parties on the limits to legitimate popular discourse and legitimate political activity.
00100100	Intergroup conflict is often exacerbated by exaggerations of the differences between one group’s values/opinions/beliefs and another’s; facilitating dialogue and communications about the similarities between the values/goals, etc. of the two groups may decrease or eliminate the desire for violence against the outgroup.	0	Moderate confidence	Bargaining/Negotiations/Dialogue Dialogue Promote dialog among groups	Diplomatic	Persuade	Ideological influencers, Material Supporters, Broader Audience	Incentivize	Hypothesis 100 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis can inform how to approach negotiations and talks with potential and actual VEOs. Engaging in or encouraging communications (especially public) about the similiarities between the values, goals, etc. of the conflicting groups may faciliate negotiations to prevent attacks. Enhancing opportunities for dialog might have a similar effect since it might reduce perceived differences and alleviate tension between groups, perhaps curbing VEO recruitment.
00101101	In conditions of inter-constituent group competition over scarce resources, encouraging groups to work in a cooperative fashion vis-à-vis resource allocation reduces VEO activity.	6	High confidence - Different	Bargaining/Negotiations/Dialogue Dialogue Promote dialog among groups	Diplomatic	Induce	Broader Audience	Incentivize	Hypothesis 101 Implications: If valid, one obvious implication of this hypothesis is to promote cooperative resource allocation across conflicting parties, at all levels. Comment: This is directly related to economic development and democracy. If all parties in society accept democracy, they will see the benefits of committing to institutional bargaining rather than using violence. This can be generated through commitment mechanisms. For example, if everyone in Iraq were given a small account that was tied to state oil revenues, no one would have the incentive to use violence to disrupt oil production and the development of this industry. As this development of resources increased, the likelihood of violence would only decrease as each person’s share of revenue and share in the stability of the system increases. Another carrot here would be to offer the opportunity for negotiation, but only in the context of single representative of each faction representing the aggrieved party or parties. By so doing, COIN forces could force some or all of the VEOs to work together rather than in competition. Caveat: While treaties may increase reputation or demonstrate a commitment to cooperation, do not spend a great deal of effort in international organizations seeking treaties related to VEO behavior.
00102102	VEOs are emboldened by state use of "soft power" in the face of provocation, leading to escalation.	0			Diplomatic	Persuade	Leaders, Loyalists		Hypothesis 102 Implications: If valid (and there is no evidence to suggest this is indeed the case), this hypothesis suggests that the United States should avoid using "soft" power in the face of provocative VEO challenges.
00103103	Addressing "root causes" and extremist rhetoric is more likely to have an effect on non- or less-committed (potential) members of VEOs than hardened members.	0	N/A	Persuasion and Counternarrative	Information	Persuade		Deligitimize, Incentivize	Hypothesis 103 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis would suggest that addressing grievances can be expected to yield results among non- or less-committeed members of the VEO, while other methods (e.g., punishment) might be more apprpriate for core or hardened members. In any event, it will often be the case that the grievances of less committed members will be more moderate than the grievances of the most committed members, and thus easier to address. Caveat: The viability of this strategy for long-term diminution of VEO activity depends on the degree to which the VEO depends on the non- or less-committeed members. Also, authorities must consider external sources of inspiration and support, which may make local redress of greivances ineffective.
00104104	Hearts and minds strategies are more effective than repression in reducing VEO activities.	3	Direct	Persuasion and Counternarrative Persuasion	Information	Induce	Broader Audience, Other populations - local	Incentivize	Hypothesis 104 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis implies that the United States should use hearts and minds strategies, rather than respression, to counter VEOs. In addition to information operations, this strategy could include providing development, security, and assistance to aggrieved populations that support VEOs rather than punishing them. Popular support is something that VEOs thrive on; and therefore taking this resource away from the insurgent groups proves to be an effective method in reducing VEO activity.
00105105	Providing evidence for (or reframing to sound like) the outgroup is not threatening the beliefs of the VEO’s constituency may reduce VEO activity.	0	N/A	Persuasion and Counternarrative Persuasion	Information, Diplomatic	Persuade	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers, Ideological influencers, Material supporters	Incentivize	Hypothesis 105 Implications: If valid, an obvious implication of this hypothesis is that in negotiations and communications with outgroups and potential VEOs, the idea should be reinforced that the United States is not threatening the other group's beliefs.
00106106	Reaffirming the esteem or prestige of the group may reduce VEO creation and activity.	0	N/A	Persuasion and Counternarrative Persuasion	Information, Diplomatic	Induce	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers, Ideological influencers, Material supporters	Incentivize	Hypothesis 106 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis suggests that by acting to reaffirm the esteem/prestige of an aggrieved group (that the VEO purports to represent), VEO creation and recruitment can be diminished. Comment: This requires deep knowledge of the grievances the group harbors and the factors that the group finds damaging to its esteem/prestige.
00107107	Influencing a potential VEO member before he/she shifts from the "virtual jihad" to actual violence in the real world will be more effective.	0	N/A	Persuasion and Counternarrative Persuasion	Information	Dissuade	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers, Ideological influencers, Material supporters	Deligitimize	Hypothesis 107 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis argues for substantial invertment in information operations and strategic communications in the virtual sphere, for example maintaining a web presence and encouraging moderate voices on VEO web pages to influence virtual terrorists before they participate in real-world violence.
00108108	Countering the virulent Islamist ideology espoused by Al Qaeda will reduce current terrorism more than addressing any other cause.	4	Direct	Persuasion and Counternarrative Persuasion Deradicalization		Persuade	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers	Deligitimize	Hypothesis 108 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis suggests that there is a need for stronger investment in information operations and strategic communication, as well as in building strong relations with moderate Muslims. Moreover, this suggests that governments need to engage deeply with Islamist clergy and scholars to find the basis for a counter-narrative based in Islamic traditions and teachings.
00109109	Deradicalization programs can reduce VEO activity.	3	Direct	Persuasion and Counternarrative Persuasion Deradicalization	Information	Dissuade	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers, Ideological influencers, Material supporters	Deligitimize	Hypothesis 109 Implications: Deradicalization programs are thought to be more diffiuclt to implement and have a lower probabiity of success than disengagment programs. However, if valid, the obvious implication is that the United States should continue to promote programs to deradicalize VEO members. This requires a clear strategy for determining which members are susceptible to deradicalization (senior leadership only, key members, all members, etc.) and customized approaches to each of these classes of members. Caveat: Depending on where the leverage point exists, this strategy could be quite cost effective or potentially cost prohibitive. Also, this strategy might be considered risky because some of the arguments in favor of this approach hinge upon keeping the leadership alive and active.
00110110	Social interaction between the VEO and the 'other' helps chances for deradicalization.	5	Direct	Persuasion and Counternarrative Persuasion Deradicalization	Information	Dissuade	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers, Ideological influencers, Material supporters	Deligitimize	Hypothesis 110 Implications: If valid, an obvious implication of this hypothesis is that the United States should facilitate interaction between VEO members and potential recruits with their perceived "other." This is a step in deradicalization/disengagement and works in conjunction with dealing with the leader of the VEO. It also may require the creation of forums for building trust, often involving trusted third parties to moderate such efforts.
00111111	Deradicalization/disengagement is more likely to succeed when efforts are initiated by the VEO leadership.	5	Direct	Persuasion and Counternarrative Persuasion Deradicalization	Information	Dissuade	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers, Ideological influencers, Material supporters	Incentivize	Hypothesis 111 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis suggests that the United States should pay the greatest attention to those cases where deradicalization or disengagement processes are initiated by a credible leader, who is often needed to justify this change to the group rank and file. Furthermore, killing or arresting leaders who might proceed down the deradicalization/disengagment pathcould therefore be counter-productive, i.e., other COIN efforts must leave in place a credible leadership that can engage.
00112112	VEO deradicalization/disengagement 'initiated at the top' is more likely to succeed if accompanied by 'inducements by the state'.	4	Direct	Persuasion and Counternarrative Persuasion Deradicalization	Information	Dissuade	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers, Ideological influencers, Material supporters	Incentivize	Hypothesis 112 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis implies that in the event that elements of the VEO leadership appear susceptible to deradicalization/disengagement, inducements from the state can serve to bolster the position of these elements relative to spoiler elements within the VEO. Such inducements must, however, be acceptable to the leadership rather than tending to undermine leadership and/or separate leadership from membership and fence-sitting public.
00113113	VEO Deradicalization/disengagement initiated at the top more is likely to succeed if accompanied by 'internal interactions between leadership and members of the movement.' [bottom up feedback]	4	Direct	Persuasion and Counternarrative Persuasion Deradicalization	Information	Dissuade	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers, Ideological influencers, Material supporters	Incentivize	Hypothesis 113 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis suggests that the leader must be given the opportunity to convince the rank and file that deradicalization/disengagmeent is the preferred strategy for the VEO. This requires an engagement strategy with the leadership, which may require a trusted third party to mediate. Moreover, any accompanying state inducements must avoid undermining the leadership and/or separating the leadership from membership and fence-sitting public.
00114114	On the whole, positive inducements seem more effective than negative ones in deradicalizing/disengaging.	9	Direct	Persuasion and Counternarrative Persuasion Deradicalization	Information	Dissuade	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers, Ideological influencers, Material supporters	Incentivize	Hypothesis 114 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis implies that in pursuing deradicalization, the United States should favor positive inducements over punishment and threats.
00115115	Deradicalization/disengagement of VEO actors is often preceded by a traumatic/significant event.	5	Moderate confidence	Persuasion and Counternarrative Persuasion Deradicalization	Information	Dissuade	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers, Ideological influencers, Material supporters	Deligitimize	Hypothesis 115 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis implies that authorities must investigate what constitutes a relevant event and then, when one occurs, to exploit the window of opportunity provided by the event to encourage deradicalization/disengagement. It might even be possible to precipitate such an event, if it is within the scope of counter-VEO or COIN activity.
00116116	The more psychological and emotional support that an ex-member of a militant group has access to post deradicalization/disengagement, the less likely he/she is to rejoin the extremist group in the future.	5	Direct	Persuasion and Counternarrative Persuasion Deradicalization	Information	Dissuade	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers, Ideological influencers, Material supporters	Incentivize	Hypothesis 116 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis would imply that authorities should develop and support programs that provide long-term emotional and psychological support to deradicalized / disengaged members of VEOs.
00117117	Deradicalization efforts using religious arguments are relatively more effective in rural areas; in urban areas efforts to disengage will be more fruitful.	0	N/A	Persuasion and Counternarrative Persuasion Deradicalization		Persuade	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers	Deligitimize	Hypothesis 117 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis implies that the United States should tailor its deradicalization/disengagment strategy to the context at hand, with religiously-based deradicalization programs in rural areas, and disengagement programs in urban ones.
00118118	Applying pressure to a radical Islamist VEO with ‘no clear charismatic leader’ will lead to fractures in the group; subsequently some groups will de-radicalize while others will not.	3	Direct	Persuasion and Counternarrative Persuasion Deradicalization		Persuade	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers	Coercion	Hypothesis 118 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis would suggest that in cases of an Islamist VEO where there is no clear charasmatic leader, the consequences of factionalization should be taken into acouint before new coercive measures are taken against the VEO. If the resultant factions are believed to be a lower threat than the original VEO, then greater pressure on the VEO might be preferred. If, however, anticipated factions are believed to present more of a threat, then it may be preferable tto refrain from increasing pressure on the VEO, or at least to be prepared to deal with and if possible, preempt, the emergent factions.
00119119	A government's clear political aim makes countering propaganda easier, thereby reducing VEO activity.	1	Direct	Persuasion and Counternarrative Deterrence by counternarrative/deligitimation	Information	Dissuade	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers, Ideological influencers, Material supporters, Broader audience	Deligitimize	Hypothesis 119 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis implies that the United States should be clear in communicating its political aims in order to make the countering of propaganda easier. This entails the use of proactive public diplomacy to explain policies to domestic and foreign publics regarding counter-VEO activity and to provide a credible counternarrative. Another implication is that a clear commitment to an overarching plan signals resolve and can bolster deterrence by denial.
00120120	If "buyers" (meaning the audience the organization seeks to serve) find the social and/or political change on offer by the VEO unattractive, VEOs will modify their behavior.	9	High confidence - Similar	Persuasion and Counternarrative Deterrence by counternarrative/deligitimation	Information	Persuade	Broader Audience	Deligitimize	Hypothesis 120 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis implies that ecause VEOs are sensitive to their target audience, information operations need to highlight (through such methods as public diplomacy, active media strategies and framing of activities) the unattractive nature of elements of VEO goals to the VEO target audience, which might constitute a potent tool for reducing the amount of constituent support for VEOs, and might in turn lead to lower levels of violence production. Caveat: if the audience is non-corporeal (e.g., "God"), there is no way to pursue a messaging strategy. Comment: If the target audience is popular, popular opinion matters and can be manipulate through media and messaging. If the audience is supernatural, COIN forces need to seek an interpreter of the divine (clergy usually) that can credibly convince the VEO that is supernatural audience does not wish the VEO to continue its activities.
00121121	If "buyers" (meaning the audience the organization seeks to serve) find the social and/or political change on offer by the VEO unattractive because it is not sought, VEOs will modify their behavior.	3	Direct	Persuasion and Counternarrative Deterrence by counternarrative/deligitimation	Information	Persuade	Broader Audience	Deligitimize	Hypothesis 121 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis implies that public diplomacy, especially that which highlights the unattractive aspects of the VEO's ideology, can be a potent tool for reducing the amount of constituent support for VEOs, which should lead to lower levels of violence production.
00122122	If "buyers" (meaning the audience the organization seeks to serve) find the social and/or political change on offer by the VEO to be illegitimately provided, VEOs will modify their behavior.	5	Direct	Persuasion and Counternarrative Deterrence by counternarrative/deligitimation	Information	Persuade	Broader Audience	Deligitimize	Hypothesis 122 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis suggests that public diplomacy and other messaging strategies that highlight the moral, ethical or religious restrictions or condemnation of VEOs' violence, can be a potent tool for reducing the amount of constituent support for VEOs, which should lead to lower levels of violence production. Comment: If the audience is popular, COIN forces need to establish a dialogue about the limits to political contestation - what activities are acceptable and which are not. If the audience is divine, COIN forces need to engage a respected interpreter that can establish what God finds acceptable - but only if that interpreter believes God does not accept violence.
00123123	Popular revulsion at VEO behavior in the short run may not be enough to stem violence, as the VEO will seek to "market" more effectively or "rebrand" their product.	2	Direct	Persuasion and Counternarrative Deterrence by counternarrative/deligitimation	Information	Persuade	Broader Audience	Deligitimize	Hypothesis 123 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis suggests that although public backlashes against VEOs may provide opportunities to influence VEOs more significantly, the window may be relatively short as VEOs can adjust their own messaging and public outrage fades over time. Another implication is that it may take time for VEOs to learn that the audience will not "buy" violence as a political "product." Counter-messaging may help, as may providing evidence that changes in product mix have not changed popular opposition - for instance, from a third-party poll.
00124124	VEOs that move into new strategies may be embarking on new forms of violence that are unacceptable to current resource providers.	3	Direct	Persuasion and Counternarrative Deterrence by counternarrative/deligitimation	Information	Persuade	Broader Audience	Deligitimize	Hypothesis 124 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis would suggest that when a VEO moves into new resource strategies, it might be fruitful to engage in information operations implying that the VEO is about to embark on froms of violence that are unacceptable to current supporters. A more controversial corollary is that VEOS should be encouraged to move into new resource strategies in order to create an opening for influence along these lines.
00125125	When VEOs change ideological platforms, it may alienate current constituent support base and suppliers.	8	Direct	Persuasion and Counternarrative Deterrence by counternarrative/deligitimation	Information	Persuade	Broader Audience	Deligitimize	Hypothesis 125 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis would imply that efforts should be made to direct influence operations (such as public diplomacy) by explicitly pointing out the change and the inconsistencies in a VEOs ideological platform. This would take advantage of a moment when VEOs may be alienating their base to win supporters away during this period of weakness and could signal an opportunity for deradicalization/disengagement efforts.
00126126	VEO 'targeting errors' can lead to erosion of popular support for the group.	9	Direct		Information	Persuade	Broader Audience		Hypothesis 126 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis would suggest, first, a focus on creating tools that can identify what might be seen as a targeting error with the right framing. Then, great effort should be put into publicizing those errors. This might even include information operations to invent instances of "targeting errors."Comment: These errors signal an opportunity for deradicalization/ disengagement efforts.
00127127	Establishing norms ("taboos") against certain attack modalities will reduce VEO attacks of that modality.	0	N/A	Persuasion and Counternarrative Deterrence by counternarrative/deligitimation	Information, Diplomatic	Dissuade	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers, Ideological influencers, Material supporters	Deligitimize	Hypothesis 127 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis suggests that strategic communications can play a large role in influencing VEO activity and that consequently there is a need for strong investment in information operations and analytical efforts examining how norms are established within the context of the relevant culture. Media tools should also be made available to operational cohort that have a chance at reaching targeted population. Comment: Creating or leveraging the taboo may depend on the nature of the audience the VEO seeks to please. If popular, then messaging to that population may be effective. If supernatural, legitimate interpreters of the will of that supernatural being are central.
00128128	Establishing norms ("taboos") against mass casualty attacks will reduce VEO attacks of that modality.	0	N/A	Persuasion and Counternarrative Deterrence by counternarrative/deligitimation	Information, Diplomatic	Dissuade	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers, Ideological influencers, Material supporters	Deligitimize	Hypothesis 128 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis suggests that strategic communications can play a large role in influencing VEO activity away from mass-casaulty attacks. Consequently there is a need for strong investment in information operations and analytical efforts examining how norms are established within the context of the relevant culture. Media tools should also be made available to an operational cohort that have a chance at reaching targeted population. Comment: Creating or leveraging the taboo may depend on the nature of the audience the VEO seeks to please. If popular, then messaging to that population may be effective. If supernatural, legitimate interpreters of the will of that supernatural being are central.
00129129	Developing an appropriate "counternarrative" will undermine the VEOs narrative.	0	N/A	Persuasion and Counternarrative Deterrence by counternarrative/deligitimation	Information, Diplomatic	Dissuade	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers, Ideological influencers, Material supporters	Deligitimize	Hypothesis 129 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis suggests that COIN forces are required to know what counter-narratives are persuasive to fence-sitting locals and under what conditions. This may also require greater coordination between COIN forces and the government more generally in order to assure a common narrative is presented at all times, as well as greater investment in the psychology of counternarratives and an increase understanding of the narratives being counteracted.
00130130	Delegitimizing VEOs' religious or political messages will reduce the likelihood of an attack because their organization will be reduced to a common organization without political or ideological influence.	0	N/A	Persuasion and Counternarrative Deterrence by counternarrative/deligitimation	Information, Diplomatic	Dissuade	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers, Ideological influencers, Material supporters	Deligitimize	Hypothesis 130 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis evidences the need for strong investment in information operations and communication – related to an investment in a clear understanding of the population socio-political dynamics, and a focus on building strong ties with alternative moderate voices. This in turn requires a deep knowledge of local conditions in order to know what actions or messages are considered illegitimate.
00131131	Manipulating religious debates in ways that delegitimize interpretations that condone terrorism can help inform broader deterrent strategies.	0	N/A	Persuasion and Counternarrative Deterrence by counternarrative/deligitimation	Information, Diplomatic	Dissuade	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers, Ideological influencers, Material supporters	Deligitimize	Hypothesis 131 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis would imply that there is a need for strong investment in information operations and strategic communication. In most cases this will require the assistance of authoritative religious figures (preferably moderate) who can speak convincingly about the unacceptability of VEO actions. Comment: influence operations in this regard should extend into virtual spaces. Caveat: This type of strategy requires COIN forces to walk a fine line between dictating what a religious figure says and allowing the religious figure to hijack a messaging campaign.
00132132	Creating a debate in the VEO milieu by engaging the VEO's narrative with moderate voices can undermine the VEO's narrative.	0	N/A	Persuasion and Counternarrative Deterrence by counternarrative/deligitimation	Information	Dissuade	Ideological Influencers, Broader Audience	Deligitimize	Hypothesis 132 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis suggests that there is a need for stronger investment in information operations and strategic communication, as well as in building strong relations with moderate voices related to the necessary milieu. Caveat: The central challenge is finding a credible voice that is not harmed by engagement with COIN forces.
00133133	Encouraging declarations against WMD use by the VEO's support community can discredit VEO ideological justification in support of WMDs.	0	N/A	Persuasion and Counternarrative Deterrence by counternarrative/deligitimation Focus on WMD	Information	Persuade	Broader Audience	Deligitimize	Hypothesis 133 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis calls for a specific strategic communication strategy, for instance working with influential moderates, such as moderate clerics, to issue statements descrediting the use of WMD. Caveat: This is not likely to be easy.
00134134	Establishing norms ("taboos") against CBRN will reduce VEO attacks of that modality.	1	Low confidence	Persuasion and Counternarrative Deterrence by counternarrative/deligitimation Focus on WMD	Information, Diplomatic	Dissuade	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers, Ideological influencers, Material supporters	Deligitimize	Hypothesis 134 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis suggests that strategic communications can play a large role in influencing VEO activity gainst CBRN use. Consequently there is a need for strong investment in information operations and analytical efforts examining how norms are established within the context of the relevant culture. Media tools should also be made available to an operational cohort that have a chance at reaching targeted population. Comment: Creating or leveraging the taboo may depend on the nature of the audience the VEO seeks to please. If popular, then messaging to that population may be effective. If supernatural, legitimate interpreters of the will of that supernatural being are central.
00135135	Legitimate grievances make suppression on its own, without addressing grievances, insufficient to reduce VEO activity.	0	N/A	Positive incentives/opening up alternative options	Economic	Induce	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers, Broader audience	Coercion	Hypothesis 135 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis would suggest that there is a need for a focused effort to address the grievances of the group that the VEO represents. Authorities should consider which greivances can be addressed and analyze whether a sufficient fraction of the aggrieved party will disengage if the "addressable" greivances are ameliorated. The hypothesis also points to a need for a theory of which "sticks" work with which ameliorative "carrots". Caveat: Addressing grievances is not always possible if the grievances are the antithesis of anything the state can bargain with.
00136136	Governments that maintain law and order will be more effective at reducing VEO activity.	8	Direct	Positive incentives/opening up alternative options		Deter			Hypothesis 136 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis enjoins the United States to assist governments in countries sympathetic to terrorist ideologies in maintaining law and order. More controversially, the United States might be more circumspect when it comes to encouraging rapid political reforms in at-risk countries because this could contribute to the breakdown of law and order.
00137137	Inducements such as "political and economic reform" aimed at the potential support base of VEOs can move these actors away from VEO support.	3	Direct	Positive incentives/opening up alternative options Economic Development & incentives	Economic	Co-opt	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers, Ideological influencers, Material supporters, Broader audiences	Incentivize	Hypothesis 137 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis implies, as mentioned earlier, that the United States should encourage political and economic reform in countries from which VEO groups draw support, and that reform measures directed specifically to the VEO's constituency might be especially effective. An example of the latter would be policies aimed at granting autonomy to peripheral ethnic groups.
00138138	In conditions of inter-constitutent group competition over scarce resources, increases in resources reduces VEO activity.	0	N/A	Positive incentives/opening up alternative options Economic Development & incentives	Economic	Induce	Broader Audience, Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers, Material Supporters, Ideological influencers	Incentivize	Hypothesis 138 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis would suggest that providing greater resources would reduce interconstituent competition, which would in turn decrease violence. One approach is to provide resources that facilitate non-violent activities (social service provision) while also creating a hostage that may be taken away. Caveat: Reducing inter-constituent competition might reduce violence, but might also strengthen an individual VEO (or VEOs) in the long-term.
00139139	Effective VEO countering requires addressing underlying social and economic issues.	2	Direct	Positive incentives/opening up alternative options Economic Development & incentives	Economic	Induce	Broader Audience, Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers, Material Supporters, Ideological influencers	Incentivize	Hypothesis 139 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis would suggest that the United States should encourage political and economic reforms in countries that give rise to terrorism. Caveat: While such an approach may be useful in reducing VEO recruitment, they are likely to be less successful in cases involving "nationalistic" VEOs, i.e., those VEOs that have as their motivation to get others out of their region.
00140140	State provision of social services where they have been lacking reduces recruitment.	7	Direct	Positive incentives/opening up alternative options Economic Development & incentives	Economic	Induce	Broader Audience	Incentivize	Hypothesis 140 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis would imply that the United States might encourage governments in countries that give rise to terrorism to provide social services, and might help to build capacity where it is lacking.
00141141	Greater economic stability reduces VEO activity.	3	Direct	Positive incentives/opening up alternative options Economic Development & incentives	Economic	Induce	Broader Audience	Incentivize	Hypothesis 141 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis would imply that the United States should encourage economic reforms in countries that give rise to terrorism. Comment: What form "economic stability" takes may matter. For instance, if the VEOs are drawn from agricultural areas, agricultural price supports and access to urban markets matter; if the VEOs are drawn from urban areas, then industrial policy and export access would matter. Stability should also be paired with sustainability; if stability comes in the form of subsidized prices for agricultural goods, the policy may not be sustainable if government revenue drops or access to international capital dries up.
00142142	US commerce in a country will increase VEO activity from that country against the USA.	3	Direct	Positive incentives/opening up alternative options Economic Development & incentives	Economic				Hypothesis 142 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis suggests that the United States government should be aware that increases in terrorism might be a negative externality of trade with a country and in the cases where a country contains VEOs antagonistic towards the United States, the possiblity of increased attacks from these VEOs against the U.S. should be included in the cost-benefit calculations concerning trade expansion. Moreover, if commerce is increased, adequate secuirty preparations should be taken to prepare for an increase in VEO activity.
00143143	State tolerance of radical but nonviolent groups (NVEOs) provides a safety valve that reduces VEO recruitment.	3	Direct	Positive incentives/opening up alternative options Opportunities for Peaceful Political Change	Diplomatic	Induce	Broader Audience, Other populations - local	No Action	Hypothesis 143 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis suggests that there should be some willingness to tolerate radical groups as long as they remain nonviolent and refrain from encouraging violence by others. Keeping political space open is low-risk option with potential for success in keeping disengaged extremists content to refrain from violence. For the U.S. military, these activities would be most relevant in its training activities and information exchanges with other militaries. Caveat: Intelligence is needed to reliably separate nonviolent groups (acceptable) from nonviolent wings of violent groups (unacceptable).
00144144	Alternatively, state tolerance of NVEOs provides a transmission belt to VEOs.	2	Direct	Positive incentives/opening up alternative options Opportunities for Peaceful Political Change	Diplomatic	Induce	Broader Audience, Other populations - local	No Action	Hypothesis 144 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis would suggest that intelligence agencies should concentrate on linkages between nonviolent radical and violent radical organizations, which may be in the form of "bridge" individuals. Furthermore, individuals participating in NVEOs should be monitored for contact with members of VEOs or involvement in nonviolent activities by VEOs (e.g., protests, social service provision, etc.) as such involvement may signal initial steps in a movement towards violence. Another implication is that it may be more productive to argue against the extremist ideology of the group, since repression of the group will likely push its members towards violence and would thus be counterproductive. Comment: This can be viewed as a warning that talk alone, in the absence of change, can lead to trouble in the long-run.
00145145	Political reforms can lower VEO activity.	9	Direct	Positive incentives/opening up alternative options Opportunities for Peaceful Political Change	Diplomatic	Co-opt	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers, Ideological influencers, Material supporters, Broader audiences	Incentivize	Hypothesis 145 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis implies that political reform (the appropriate form being dependent on the specific context for each VEO) should be encouraged, especially in countries that give rise to VEO formation and activity. In countries where the U.S. military has strategic partnerships with local militaries or police, information on how political reforms can make these parties' jobs easier can help smooth the path for political reforms. (In many countries, entrenched military interests are key obstacles to implement reforms. On the other hand, with military buy-in, reform processes can become much easier to implement.)
00146146	The existence of a substitute means or mechanism to achieve the VEOs' goals reduces VEOs' violent activities.	3	Direct	Positive incentives/opening up alternative options Opportunities for Peaceful Political Change	Diplomatic	Co-opt	Leaders, Loyalists	Incentivize	Hypothesis 146 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis implies that access to alternative opportunities to advance the VEO's ideological goals may reduce or eliminate their use of violence. Therefore, COIN forces need to provide VEOs with alternatives to violence as a vehicle for political change and redress of greivance. Examples of such alternatives may be other non-violent political organizations or political/social change itself. Comment: in many cases this means that policy needs to focus on encouraging democratization and civil rights and allowing VEO to participate in electoral politics.
00147147	Violence and nonviolence can be substitute means of achieving the same goals, therefore when a VEO pursues or engages in non-violent activities it will produce less violence.	4	Direct	Positive incentives/opening up alternative options Opportunities for Peaceful Political Change	Diplomatic	Co-opt	Leaders, Loyalists	Incentivize	Hypothesis 147 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis suggests that when VEOs adopt non-violent means of expression (even if concurrent with violent activities), these should be encouraged, rather than rebuffed because it may ultimately lead the VEO to move away from violence comnpletely. Caveat: This may also increase the VEO's legitimacy, leading to a long-term increase in support.
00148148	Freedom, openess and participation will lower VEO activity.	2	Direct	Positive incentives/opening up alternative options Opportunities for Peaceful Political Change Democracy Promotion	Diplomatic	Induce	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers, Ideological influencers, Material supporters, Broader audience, Other populations	Incentivize	Hypothesis 148 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis suggests that avenues should be found to encourage and increase opportunities for peaceful expression (including media freedom) and political participation in countries from which VEOs recruit or draw support, or in which they operate. It may also suggest that even when the VEO uses the media to promote its agenda the very fact that it can promote its agenda unhindered undermines the group's case.
00149149	Policy deadlock can lead to increases in VEO attacks as actors go outside of institutional means to try to achieve their goals.	7	Direct	Positive incentives/opening up alternative options Opportunities for Peaceful Political Change Democracy Promotion	Diplomatic	Induce	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers, Ideological influencers, Material supporters, Broader audience, Other populations	Incentivize	Hypothesis 149 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis implies that, where possible, efforts should be made to avoid policy deadlock, since violence is one reaction to political failure. For example, binding arbitration for a policy dispute or the acceptance of partial solutions (such as a federal administration that allows the parties to realize some political goals in limited geographic areas) can help avoid logjams. Caveats: Especially for DOD, it is risky to become directly involved in politics and attempt to break political deadlocks.
00150150	Political competition in a regime decreases terrorist attacks.	7	Direct	Positive incentives/opening up alternative options Opportunities for Peaceful Political Change Democracy Promotion	Diplomatic	Induce	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers, Ideological influencers, Material supporters, Broader audience, Other populations	Incentivize	Hypothesis 150 Implications: If valid, one implication of this hypothesis is that where possible, political participation can be modified to be more inclusive and thus to have more of an effect on terror. Caveat: The implications of this finding depend in part on the context: in some cases, the parties to the political competition can be generating the terror; in others, the parties can exercise control over the parties engaging in terror.
00151151	Increasing the capability of the government will lower VEO activity.	2	Direct	Other					Hypothesis 151 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis builds on the standard assumption that successful COIN requires a certain threshold of state capacity, since failed and failing states (or even regions within otherwise functioning states with no state influence), cannot effectively administer internal security. The main implication would be that the United States should continue efforts to build partner capacity in countries that give rise to terrorism. These efforts could be directed towards strengthening the state through building institutions (institutional capacity), taxation (resources), or strengthening law enforcement and the military (coercive capacity).
00152152	Lack of strong institutions and control by government leads to more VEO activity.	7	Direct	Other					Hypothesis 152 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis suggests that substantial efforts should be made to strengthen institutions and government control in countries that give rise to VEO activity, since this will increase the efficacy of any influence operations and without sufficient capacity, even states with strog incentives to reduce VEO activity are likely to be unable to do so. In an international context, this suggests that the United States should continue efforts to build partner capacity and encourage political reforms in countries that give rise to terrorism.
00153153	Groups and individuals prefer to have an optimal level of uniqueness and distinctiveness; a group that is similar will threaten the group’s distinctiveness which may prompt intergroup issues.	8	High confidence - Similar	Other	Information				Hypothesis 153 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis can inform how to approach negotiations and talks with outgroups and potential or actual VEOs. It will be important to show respect for cultural differences and to offer sincere praise about unique traits or accomplishments of the group from which the VEO draws support.
00154154	The more competition (Five Forces) VEOs face for constituent support, the more violence VEOs produce (outbidding).	4	Direct	Other			Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers	Denial	Hypothesis 154 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis implies that attempts to weaken VEOs by increasing competition between VEOs, and between VEOs and non-violent political organizations, or fragmenting existing VEOs may lead to more violence rather than less. Comment: One strategic response might be to systematically seek to remove the weaker competitors to reduce the outbidding dynamic.
00155155	Suicide terrorism is increased as the number of VEOs competing for societal support increases (outbidding).	2	Direct	Other			Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers	Denial	Hypothesis 155 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis would suggest that intense forms of competition between VEOs may lead to extreme forms of violence, such as suicide terrorism. One strategic response might be to intervene in constituent politics (for example, to remove the weaker competitors) to dampen this rivalry.
00156156	VEOs may engage in violence/may increase the use of violence in order to forestall formation of competitor organizations.	4	Direct	Other			Leaders, Loyalists	Denial	Hypothesis 156 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis would imply that the emergence of new organizations requires particular vigilance by COIN forces, as violence might not only arise from the new entrant, but might actually increase from the existing VEO. Conversely, another implication is that increases in violence by a VEO may indicate internal dissension, thus signaling an opportunity to target the VEO more effectively.
00157157	The more competition a terrorist group faces from rival VEOs, the more likely it is to fail.	3	Direct	Other			Leaders, Loyalists	Denial	Hypothesis 157 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis would imply that promoting dissension and fragmentation within a VEO's constituency and/or organization may lead to a short-term increase in violence, but an increased likelihood that the VEO will desist in the long-term. One strategic response might be to refrain from targeting smaller groups when a primary VEO is being focused on for elimination. Another might be to hasten the competitive process by making resource gathering more difficult. If all organizations are competing for a shrinking resources supply, some or all may fail. Caveat: the attendant increases in violence from more VEO competition might outweigh the decreased viability of the VEO in the long run. Also, any smaller group that is encouraged may eventually pose a greater threat than the original VEO adversary (the "Hamas Caveat").
00158158	Government pressures and coercion cause fragmentation and splintering, leading to outbidding in extremism and escalation.	2	Direct	Other				Coercion	Hypothesis 158 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis would imply that policies that put pressure on specific VEOs and their constituencies may have unintended side effects in the form of fragmentation of the VEOs and an increase in overall violence (as some of the VEOs are likely to become increasingly radical, and engage in outbidding), and making reaching a stable political settlement more difficult. Ultimately, the implication is that there is a need, prior to engaging in any coercive measures, to assess the threat of splintered violence vs the existence of ongoing focused violence.
00159159	In conditions of inter-constitutent group competition over scarce resources, reframing the amount of resources to sound less scarce reduces VEO activity.	0	N/A	Other	Economic	Persuade	Broader Audience	Incentivize	Hypothesis 159 Implications: If valid, one implication of this hypothesis at the societal level is that even if the amount of available resources cannot be increased, reframing the amount of resources available may reduce intergroup conflict. For example, using tools of conflict resolution such as using interest-centered negotiation, could reduce the beliefs on each side that resources are zero-sum and thus scarce. Another implication, at the level of the VEOs, is that making resources appear less scarce, might reduce inter-constitutent competition, and thus lead to less conflict between VEOs, which may be worthwhile. Caveat: Reducing inter-constituent competition might reduce violence, but might also strengthen an individual VEO (or VEOs) in the long-term.
00160160	VEOs with diversified supplier relationships are harder to coerce, deter, and co-opt.	7	Moderate confidence	Other			Material Supporters, State-based support	Coercion	Hypothesis 160 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis would suggest that VEOs' resource endowments and supplies need to be considered more fully - financial, human, information, external (via networks), material (in terms of access to weapons and explosives), etc. To increase the probability of success of influendce operations, the United States should seek to eliminate as many actual and potential supplier relationships with terrorists as possible. Another possible implication is that to maximize success, the U.S. should seek to focus its coercion efforts on VEOs without diversified supplier relationships. Comment: The goal of resource interdiction is to reduce the number of suppliers across all supply systems. Caveat: Each form of resource may have a different supply system. If VEOs have access to multiple suppliers in each system it will be substantially more difficult to disrupt the VEO, as there are substitutes between systems.
00161161	When VEOs make new friends/connections, it may alienate current supporters and suppliers.	1	Direct	Other				Deligitimize	Hypothesis 161 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis would suggest that the United States could issue information operations disseminating that a VEO has developed a relationship with a new friend that could antagonize its current supporters. Comment: Deradicalization programs could be stepped up when this occurs.
00162162	When VEOs change ideological platforms, it may reduce competition within the constituent base.	8	Direct	Other				Deligitimize	Hypothesis 162 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis would imply that efforts should be made to direct influence operations (such as public diplomacy) by explicitly pointing out the change and the inconsistencies in a VEOs ideological platform. This would take advantage of a moment when VEOs may be alienating their base to win supporters away during this period of weakness and could signal an opportunity for deradicalization/disengagement efforts.
00163163	An extremist group's loss of operational control will increase its likelihood to de-radicalize or end altogether.	1	Direct	Other				Deligitimize	Hypothesis 163 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis would imply that authorities should aim to keep pressure on terrorist groups until terrorist leaders lose operational control over their organization. It also may imply a focus on decapitation, which means increased recourses for intelligence and special forces.
00164164	Increased American dominance in the international system has led to more terrorism.	3	Direct	Other					Hypothesis 164 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis would seem to suggest that, from the perspective of prevneting terrorism, the United States should reduce its footprint (or at least the perception of its dominance) in the internaitonal system wherever possible. Caveat: This approach is unlikely to be implmentable given the plethora of other U.S. national interests that require it to maintain a large international footprint.
00165165	As US military aid to and intervention in foreign countries increase, terrorist attacks by VEOs from those countries on US citizens increase.	8	Direct	Other					Hypothesis 165 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis suggests a need to explicitly consider the potential for an increased VEO threat when weighing the costs versus benefits of military aid and intervention in foreign countries that spawn VEOs. Coimment: Context is important, e.g., is the US in the country with the approval of its government?
00166166	US troops in a country that is not a democracy will increase VEO activity against the USA.	7	Direct	Other					Hypothesis 166 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis would imply that the stationing of troops in non-democracies needs to be weighed differently than stationing troops in a democracy. The costs of stationing troops in a non-democracy are higher (increased VEO attacks on U.S. citizens and interests) and are merited only when there is a clear strategic imperative that there be a US military presence in that country that warrants an increased risk to American civilians and military personnel.
00167167	Persistence of safe havens will increase VEO activity	3	Direct	Other				Denial	Hypothesis 167 Implications: If valid, the hypothesis would imply that the United States should redouble its already substantial efforts to eliminate terrorist safe havens. This might be achieved through military measures, such as drone strikes that harass terrorists, to cooperation with or pressure on the states whose territories are being used as safe havens, to development efforts to eliminate the popular support that is necessary for terrorists to establish and maintain a safe haven.
00168168	Tolerance by a state of a VEO in its territory (e.g. safe haven) will lead to a reduction of that VEO’s domestic activity but increase its transnational activity.	3	Direct	Other				Denial	Hypothesis 168 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis suggests that the United States should be cognizant when trying to convince other states to act against safe havens, that the state may have an incentive to maintain the safe haven if there exists an explicit or tacit bargain with a VEO to focus its attacks overseas. Counterterrorism efforts may then be forced to relatively increase sticks and carrots when dealing with such states.
00169169	An increase in VEO attacks in one location will lead to an increase in adjacent locations (contagion effect).	3	Direct	Other					Hypothesis 169 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis suggests that following an increase in VEO attacks in one area, counterterrorism forces should prepare for similar increases in adjoining areas and deploy their resources accordingly.
00170170	International treaties do not decrease VEO activity.	7	Direct	Other	Diplomatic			Coercion	Hypothesis 170 Implications: If valid, the obvious implication of this hypothesis is that, while they might serve other purposes, the signing of international treaties will not be an effective element of U.S. counterterrorism strategy. Comment: Whereas treaties and convention may not deter VEOs, they could have an indirect effect on VEOs via state sponsors.
00171171	Ineffective learning by counterinsurgency forces will lead to more VEO activity and success.	6	Direct	Other					Hypothesis 171 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis implies that learning strategies and assessments need to be built into counterinsurgency efforts from the start of deployment and include regular checks to see if the learning process is effective. Comment: evaluation of learning needs to be done not only internally but also by external reviewers as well, since, for example, misapplication of analogies can lead to disaster (the US misapplied some of the lessons learned in Guatemala in 1954 seven years later at the Bay of Pigs).
00172172	Indirect counterinsurgency methods are more successful than measures that interfere with the population (e.g. occupying forces increase VEO activity).	8	Direct	Other		Induce	Broader Audience		Hypothesis 172 Implications: If valid, the obvious implication of this hypothesis is to favor indirect methods and wherever possible to avoid COIN operations that negatively impact the population.
00173173	Threatening what the terrorists and their supporters hold dear can be an effective method if we understand the values held by the different levels of a terrorist group and support network.	1	Direct					Coercion	Hypothesis 173 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis implies that the United States should favor a tailored deterrence policy directed distinctively towards different elements of a VEO. To accomplish this, the United States should launch a systematic cultural intelligence collection effort to better understand what terrorists and their supporters at different levels of the network hold dear and then threaten to hold those values at risk. Comment: Some policies (such as sanctions and legal redress) may be more likely to work on supporters and financiers than actual fighters.
00174174	Population centric counterinsurgency (living in population and protecting them) is more effective than other counterinsurgency measures at reducing VEO activity.	1	Direct			Persuade	Broader Audience, Other populations - local		Hypothesis 174 Implications: If valid, one implication of this hypothesis is that smaller counterinsurgency units should be placed within cities/population centers rather than maintaining large bases of troops distant from these locations. This reflects the belief that a deep understanding of populations can be effective at curbing VEOs.
00175175	VEOs may be manipulated through five channels: suppliers, buyers, rivals, substitutes, and new entrants.	9	High confidence - Similar						Hypothesis 175 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis suggests that it might be worthwhile to invest resources to empirically classify VEO groups relationship to these five channels, since manipulation of the Five Forces of Competition provides additional influence channels beyond attempts to either reduce support for VEOs or increase the costs of their violence production. Comment: Although many existing counter-terrorism policies fit within this framework, the Five Forces model may be useful for unifying these policies for maximum efficiency and identifying additional means of influencing VEOs. The essential implication is that organizations negotiate for resource supply but are subject to controls by supplier; organizations must provide a "product" (political and social change) acceptable to a set of "buyers" (public, government, government elites), must consider "substitutes" (organizations attempting to provide political and social change through less or non-violent methods), must be more efficient/effective/acceptable than "competitors" (organizations attempting to represent the same aggreived groups or attempting to achieve the same ends), and must consider possible entrants (who may have new technologies, supporters, or resources).
00176176	If the adversary sees that there are no benefits to restraint, it will work against the deterring party.	9	Direct		Information	Deter	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers	Coercion	Hypothesis 176 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis would suggest that there should be tangible and explicitly broadcast benefits for refraining from violence. For example, the United States could clearly state in its declaratory policy that it will not attack groups that refrain from participating in the proscribed action and then must follow through on those promises of restraint.
00177177	Competition over resources leads to intergroup conflict.	8	High confidence - Different					Incentivize	Hypothesis 177 Implications: If valid, one impication of this hypothesis at the societal level is to increase the amount of available resources (e.g., by promoting economic development or giving aid) in a region/country plagued by conflict. Another implication, at the level of the VEOs, is that making resource gathering more difficult, might enhance competition over a shrinking resources supply, and thus lead to conflict between VEOs, which may be worthwhile. Caveat: As discussed in other hypotheses, authorities should balance the prospects for increased violence stemming from inter-VEO competition versus the damage this competotion may do to the VEOs' longevity.
00178178	Loss of external popular support can hasten the demise of a VEO.	1	Direct			Persuade	Broader Audience	Deligitimize	Hypothesis 178 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis would suggest that for conflicts where a diaspora is involved, messaging in places where the diaspora has significant presence matters. Information operations and other efforts should be used to cut financial links and raise the costs of linkages between diaspora and VEO actors. Strategic cooperation with third countries where these diasporas reside also matters. Comment: Cutting diaspora support is an effective means of directly effecting VEO capacity (e.g., Sri Lanka) and is an example of the use of soft power to draw away a VEO's constituency.
00179179	Attempts at deterrence lead to increased VEO activity by signaling salience to the state of attack modalities.	0	N/A		Diplomatic, Information	Deter	Leaders	Coercion	Hypothesis 179 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis generally suggests that there is some risk of increased VEO activity associated with attempts to deter. Specifically, if attack modalities are the key factor, then deterrence must be more broadly based - against all forms of violence - so that no one modality is singled out, i.e., this indicates a preference for strategic deterrence by denial over tactical deterrence by denial.
00180180	Localizing anti-VEO efforts (tailoring efforts to local values, etc.) will reduce VEO activities.	0	N/A						Hypothesis 180 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis suggests that COIN forces are required to know what counter-narratives are persuasive to fence-sitting locals and under what conditions, with an emphasis on local data gathering and innovative ways of collecting data. There is consequently a need for long term investment in locating personnel in regions and retaining successful personnel in these regions so local ties can be exploited over a longer period of time. This effort requires a mix of local engagement with political and social elites and polling to determine whether COIN forces actions are consistent with local expectations. This may also require greater coordination between COIN forces and the government more generally in order to assure a common narrative is presented at all times, as well as greater investment in the psychology of counternarratives and an increase understanding of the narratives being counteracted.
00181181	States' influence efforts will be more successful if they refrain from providing symbols of injustice that feed into the VEO narrative.	7	Direct			Persuade	Broader Audience	Deligitimize	Hypothesis 181 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis implies that a high premium needs to be put on “mistake” prevention when it comes to the use of kinetic operations. A focus also needs to be put into civil rights protection and development when working with the local government. Comment: Influence operations require COIN forces to know which symbols have negative valence locally, which in turn requires a mix of local engagement with political and social elites and polling.
00182182	Counterinsurgency approaches will lose effectiveness over time.	6	Direct						Hypothesis 182 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis would imply that authorities cannot rely on one single doctrine or strategy for very long. Each conflict will be time and region dependent, and strategies will need to be adjusted overtime when conflicts persist. It may imply further that there should be a conscious building of a repertoire of counter-VEO approaches and these should be put on a clear calendar rotation determined by a timeline established through empirical research about when counter-VEO approaches will lose effectiveness.
00183183	Decentralization in decision making can lead to a decrease in VEO activity.	-1	Direct						Hypothesis 183 Implications: If valid, this hypothesis would suggest that authorities should use pressure on the leadership of the organization to force decentralization, for example by preventing new leaders from ascending or firm lines of communication to be developed. Caveat: Decentralization can lead to the radicalization of splinter groups, which can eaxcerbate the overall VEO problem even as it hampers a single VEO.

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